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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The proceeding before the Third District Court was an action for indemnification 
involving Windsor Insurance Company (hereinafter "Windsor"), plaintiff and appellant, 
and American States Insurance Company (hereinafter "American States"), defendant and 
appellee, Civil number 980903520. (R. 1). The primary issue presented to the district 
court was whether American States owed coverage to Brenda Chambers (and thus 
indemnification to Windsor) under its insurance policy issued to Labor Services, Inc. (R. 
4). 
Pursuant to Windsor's uninsured motorist coverage, Windsor paid the sums for 
which Brenda Chambers was legally liability as a result of injuries suffered by Windsor's 
insured, Kathryn Zaborski. (R. 2-3). Upon paying the sums owed by Brenda Chambers, 
Windsor obtained a judgment against Brenda Chambers and subsequently sought 
indemnification from American States because it provided primary coverage for Brenda 
Chambers's negligence occurring within the course and scope of her employment with 
Labor Services, Inc. ("LSI"). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended). 
1 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue Presented for Review: Was the district court's entry of a summary 
judgment in favor of American States erroneous and was the district court's denial of 
Windsor's motion for summary judgment erroneous? (R. 174). 
Standard of Review: A district court's award of a summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness. Rinderknecht v. Luck. 965 P.2d 564 (Utah App. 1998) ("This 
appeal is from a summary judgment, which is granted only when 'there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 'Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for 
review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve 
factual issues, this Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.' Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 
(Utah 1989) (per curiam). Accord Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)."). This Court will view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Windsor. 
See United Park City Mines Co. v.Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 
P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994). 
Issue Presented for Review: Was Brenda Chambers acting within the course 
2 
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and scope of her employment when she traveled to the premises of her special employer at 
the behest of her general employer? (R. 35). 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). When the 
underlying facts are not in dispute, the determination of whether an injury occurred within 
the course of employment is a conclusion of law. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 110 P.2d 334, 334 (1941). "The requirement that the accident arise in 
the course of employment is satisfied if it occurs while the employee is rendering 
service to his employer, which he was hired to do, at the time when and in the place 
where his employer directed him to render such service." Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 
P.2d 903 (Utah 1996) (citing M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 488, 493, 189 
P.2d 132, 134(1948)). 
Also, Brenda Chambers's travel within the course of her employment is a condition 
precedent under the insuring clause contained in American States's insurance policy. 
Because this is a question of insurance coverage, review is for correctness and all facts are 
viewed in the light most favorable to a finding of coverage. See Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co.. 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997); Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 
664, 665 (Utah 1992). "In interpreting an insurance policy, courts have uniformly 
resolved ambiguities, if any there be, in a policy strictly against the insurer and in favor of 
the insured." LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). This 
3 
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Court interprets insurance contracts in favor of coverage and, where ambiguous, in favor 
of the insured. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) (citing 
DiEnes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 442 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1968)). 
Issue Presented for Review: Was the district court's alternative conclusion 
that the statute of limitations applicable to Brenda Chambers's negligence barred actions 
against American States regarding its contractual obligations even though Brenda 
Chambers's legal liability for negligence had been determined prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations on that issue and prior to initiating the present litigation? (R. 122). 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. See Cathco. Inc. v. Valentiner Crane Brunjes Onyon Architects, 944 P.2d 365, 
369 (Utah 1997): see also Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361, 1375 (Utah 1996) (explaining 
that the Defendant bears the burden of proving every element necessary to establish an 
affirmative defense) because this issue was determined on summary judgment it is 
reviewed for correctness. Estes v. Tibbs. 979 P.2d 823, 824 (Utah 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDING, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
This is an appeal of the district court's error in ruling that American States's 
insurance policy did not provide coverage based on the conclusion that "going-and-
coming" rule is applicable to the undisputed facts. (R. 285 Transcript at p. 51-54). 
4 
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On March 22, 1999, Windsor moved for a summary judgment based on its 
contention that American States's insurance policy provided primary coverage to Brenda 
Chambers. (R. 35). On May 21, 1999, American States, in turn, filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment based on its contention that the lack of privity of contract between 
plaintiff and defendant precluded any recovery for plaintiff and on its contention that its 
contractual obligations were governed by the 4-year statute of limitations applicable to 
causes of action sounding in tort. (R. 76). The district court ruled from the bench 
subsequent to oral argument held on August 2, 1999 that American States's policy did not 
provide coverage for Brenda Chambers based on the Court's interpretation of the "going-
and-coming" rule. (R. 285 Transcript at p. 51-54). 
On September 2, 1999, Windsor filed a motion for a new trial based on its 
contention that the court failed to properly apply the "going-and-coming" rule to the 
undisputed facts. (R. 185). The district court refused to reconsider its ruling and the 
district court denied the motion in a signed MINUTE ENTRY DECISION which was filed 
in the Third Judicial District Court on December 8, 1999. (R. 264). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On Saturday, May 15, 1993, LSI called Brenda Chambers and asked her to 
work at the landfill. (R. 41, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at pp. 5-8). 
2. LSI always called Ms. Chambers at home when it needed her services. (R. 41, 
5 
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Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 31). 
3. Ms. Chambers accepted the assignment. (R. 41, Deposition of Brenda 
Chambers at p. 10). 
4. Ms. Chambers advised LSI that she would need to go to the store to purchase 
nylons prior to going to the jobsite. (R. 41, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 10). 
5. LSI requires all workers in office positions to wear dresses and nylons. (R. 41, 
Deposition of Brenda Chambers at pp. 13-14). 
6. LSI responded that the landfill would expect her to arrive at 9:30 a.m. (R. 41, 
Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 10). 
7. Ms. Chambers went to the Pik 'N' Save (now MacFrugal's) near her home to 
purchase nylons and she put them on in her car before leaving the parking lot. (R. 41, 
Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 11). 
8. If Ms. Chambers had not been required to purchase the nylons, she still would 
have taken the same street going Westbound. (R. 41, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at 
p. 22). 
9. After purchasing the nylons and putting them on, Ms. Chambers began to go 
directly to her work assignment at the landfill. (R. 41, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at 
p. 37). 
10. Ms. Chambers proceeded to make a left-hand turn from the parking lot in 
order to proceed West on 5300 South. (R. 42, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at pp. 11-
6 
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13). 
11. A big, jacked-up truck was attempting to pull into the parking lot that Ms. 
Chambers was leaving. (R. 42, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 11). 
12. The truck could not enter the parking-lot driveway until Ms. Chambers 
vacated it, therefore the truck stopped in its lane of traffic. (R. 42, Deposition of Brenda 
Chambers at pp. 11-12). 
13. Ms. Chambers could not see around the truck, but the truck waved to her. (R. 
42, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 12). 
14. Ms. Chambers interpreted the wave as an "all-clear" signal, and she pulled 
into traffic. (R. 42, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 12). 
15. As Ms. Chambers pulled into traffic, she was hit by a vehicle driven by 
Kathryn Zaborski. (R. 42, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 12). 
16. Both Ms. Chambers and Ms. Zaborski were taken by ambulance to the 
hospital. (R. 42, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at pp. 24-25). 
17. When Ms. Chambers got to the hospital she had a nurse call LSI and advise 
them that she had been injured and would not make it to her assignment. (R. 42, 
Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 9). 
18. Ms. Chambers later told LSI's employee, Camille, about the accident. (R. 
42, Deposition of Brenda Chambers at p. 17). 
19. After paying its insured for her damages, Windsor sued Brenda Chambers 
7 
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and obtained a default judgment against her in the sum of $41,299.23 on or about August 
20, 1996. (R.43). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court improperly applied the "going-and-coming" rule to the 
undisputed facts of this case. If Brenda Chambers was acting within the course and scope 
of her employment with LSI at the time of the accident giving rise to Kathryn Zaborski's 
injuries, then Brenda Chambers was an insured under American States's insurance policy 
(LSI was the named insured). In other words, if Brenda Chambers was acting within the 
course and scope of her employment with LSI, then American States must provide 
indemnification to Windsor based upon its express obligation to Brenda Chambers. 
Indemnification is owed to Windsor because Windsor defended Brenda Chambers and 
paid her liability under its uninsured motorist coverage whereas American States had a 
primary obligation to defend Brenda Chambers and to indemnify her under its liability 
coverage. 
A temporary employee's performance of a temporary employment agency's only 
service is not transmuted into a "commute to a fixed place of employment" simply because 
the temporary employer does not apportion compensation to that particular part of the 
temporary employee's services. An employee is acting within the course and scope of her 
employment when the employee's travel provides a benefit to the employer. A temporary 
8 
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employee has two employers at the same time (a special employer and a general 
employer). Brenda Chambers was "commuting" with respect to her special employer, but 
she was "traveling" with respect to her general employer. Moreover, Brenda Chambers 
had no fixed place of employment. Under Utah law, the "going-and-coming" rule only 
applies to employees who have a fixed place of employment. LSI conducted its entire 
business through the travel of its temporary employees to the premises of its clients; 
therefore, its insurance policy provides coverage for "its" actions taken by and through its 
employees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AMERICAN STATES'S INSURANCE POLICY WILL BE 
INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF ITS INSURED — BRENDA 
CHAMBERS. 
Brenda Chambers (Windsor1) is entitled to primary coverage from American States. 
See Fuller v. Director of Finance. 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 1985) ("An insured is 
entitled to the broadest protection he could have reasonably understood to be provided by 
the policy."); see also Geico v. Dennis. 645 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982) ("the interpretation of 
1
 An action by Windsor against American States is proper under equitable 
principles because Windsor paid a debt which in equity and good conscience should have 
been paid by American States. Equity disregards unduly formalistic requirements in 
order to secure justice. There is no good reason why the wrongdoer insurer should be 
free of its contractual liability by the fortuitous event of its insured's poverty and 
concomitant inability to punish the insurer's misconduct. 
9 
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the terms involved is not fixed but varies according to the circumstances of the case. * * * 
[M]ost courts will interpret the terms so as to extend the coverage if this can be done under 
any reasonable interpretation of the facts." (quoting Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. 
Home Indemnity Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 303, 50 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511-12 (1976) (other 
citations omitted))). 
American States knew that it was issuing liability coverage for the negligence of 
LSI's employees because a corporation only acts through its employees. This knowledge 
is imputed to American States by law: 
The law of agency is based on the Latin maxim "Qui facit per 
alium, facit per se," variously rendered as "He who does an act 
through another is deemed in law to do it himself,.... 
2A C.J.S. Agency § 2, p. 549. In other words Brenda Chambers was an insured for actions 
that were within the course and scope of her employment because she is deemed in law to 
have been acting as LSI. Therefore, the question presented to the district court was 
whether Brenda Chambers's conduct giving rise to Windsor's payment of insurance 
benefits to Kathryn Zaborski occurred within the course and scope of Ms. Chambers's 
employment. 
The unrebutted testimony of Brenda Chambers establishes2 that she was called on a 
2
 It is well-settled that a person claiming the benefits of an insurance contract has 
the burden to bring herself within the terms of the insuring clause. Such a rule is properly 
stated as follows: "The burden is on plaintiff to prove that the loss or injury sued for was 
due to a risk or cause which was insured against; but, where plaintiff makes out a prima 
10 
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Saturday and asked to travel to the landfill to provide temporary clerical services. Brenda 
Chambers did what she was asked to do when she was asked to do it; therefore, her travel 
was a term of her employment, and she was American States's insured when she injured 
Kathryn Zaborski. 
II. TRAVEL UNDERTAKEN BY BRENDA CHAMBERS TO 
ARRIVE AT THE LANDFILL IS EXCEPTED FROM 
APPLICATION OF THE "GOING-AND-COMING" RULE AND 
WAS WITHIN THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT. 
The Defendant urged the district court to confuse the "going-and-coming" rule with 
this class of cases — to wit: Where a journey is the essence of the employee's service to 
her employer,3 the journey is within the course and scope of employment. An employee 
who is required to report to various or constantly changing work sites is not generally 
facie case of loss or injury within the terms of the policy, it is incumbent on defendant to 
rebut such case." 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1316 b(6) at p. 399; accord Griffin v. Prudential 
Ins. Co. of America. 133 P.2d 333 (Utah 1943). Thus, Windsor only needs to make out 
a prima facie case that Brenda Chambers was acting within the course and scope of 
her employment in order to satisfy the condition precedent contained in American 
States's insuring clause and to prove American States's contractual liability. 
3
 Examples of other professions whose travel is the essence of their job would be: 
truck drivers, police officers, firemen, stewardesses, pizza deliverymen, milkmen, etc. Of 
course, the "going-and-coming" rule could apply to travel of these workers as well as 
temporary workers. A truck driver could "commute" to the garage to pick up his truck. 
A police officer could "commute" to the jail to receive his instructions for the day. A 
pizza deliveryman could be required to begin his delivery schedule after "commuting" to 
the restaurant. And a temporary employee could be required to "commute" to the 
business office of the agency before traveling to the premises of the special employer. 
11 
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subject to the "going-and-coming" rule.4 Defendant's flat assertion that Brenda Chambers 
was "commuting" because she was traveling between her home and the place where she 
planned to work that day (and that day only) is not sufficient to invoke the preclusive 
effect of the "going-and-coming" rule. 
Brenda Chambers "was performing for [her general] employer a substantial service 
required by [her] employment at the place and in the manner so required." Moser v. 
Industrial Commission, 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968). "This case, like Moser, is 
distinguishable from the usual case of going to, or coming from, work . . . ." Kinne v. 
Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). The "going and coming" rule only 
applies to "'an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment. . . 
.'" Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, 
Larson's Law of Workmen's Compensation § 16.11, at 4-204). 
Temporary employment, by its5 nature, subjects temporary employees to the 
hazards of the street. This fact distinguishes Brenda Chambers from a traditional 
4
 It is well-settled that, generally, "traveling to and from work is not part of the 
employment." Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber/Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 465 P.2d 175, 
176 (Utah 1970). Thus, negligence of an employee while commuting to a fixed 
premises does not normally give rise to an employer's vicarious liability. See Whitehead 
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989). 
5
 Windsor acknowledges that some temporary employment situations resemble 
permanent employment. When general terms or statements regarding "temporary 
employment" are used herein, such statements are meant to apply to those temporary 
employment situations that resemble the undisputed facts of this case. 
12 
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employee who is simply going to a fixed place of work6 for a fixed number of hours and 
who, during the commute, is not yet engaged in performing any service growing out of 
and/or incidental to the employment terms and conditions. 
Although this case centers on Brenda Chambers's status as an insured, the analysis 
is nearly identical to inquiring into LSI's joint and several liability for the torts of its 
employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior? American States relies on the 
"going-and-coming" rule to deny coverage because that rule — when applicable — may 
preclude the imposition of vicarious liability for the same reasons the doctrine of 
respondeat superior imposes vicarious liability. 
The "going-and-coming" rule has been adopted because: 
[I]t is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct 
of its employees over which it has no control and from which it 
derives no benefit. 
6
 "The rule excluding off-premises injuries during the journey to and from work 
does not apply if the making of the journey * * * is in itself a substantial part of the 
service for which the worker is employed." 1 Arthur Larson, Larson's Law of 
Workmen's Compensation § 16.00, at 4-193). 
7
 It is a longstanding rule of law that "[a] master is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused by the negligent conduct of servants within the scope of employment." 
Restatement of the law, Second, of Agency § 243. An employer assumes the torts of his 
employees when he enters into employment contracts with them because "[i]t would be 
unjust to permit an employer to gain from the intelligent cooperation of others without 
being responsible for the mistakes, the errors of judgment and the frailties of those 
working under his direction and for his benefit." Restatement of the law, Second, of 
Agency § 219. 
13 
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IcL at 937; accord Kinne v. Industrial Common. 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) (holding that 
employer must receive some benefit). 
Conversely, it is wholly appropriate to impose vicarious liability on an employer 
where a victim's injury results from conduct of an employee over whom the employer 
does have control and from whose actions it does derive a benefit. Thus, the primary 
focus, in determining whether or not the "going-and-coming" rule should apply, is on the 
benefit LSI received from Brenda Chambers's travel. See Whitehead v. Variable Annuity 
Life Insurance Co.. 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989) (stating that "the major focus in 
determining whether or not the general [going-and-coming] rule should apply . . . is on the 
benefit the employer receives and his control over the conduct."). 
In sum, the journey-as-part-of-service principle precludes the application of the 
"going-and-coming" rule to Brenda Chambers's travel. Travel to the premises of the 
temporary employment agency's client was a necessary and interrelated part of the 
temporary employee's duties.8 Therefore, the cost of liability insurance to insure against 
losses arising out of the negligence of employees through whom the temporary labor 
8
 LSI chooses its business structure. It cannot avoid liability simply by asking its 
employees to begin the corporation's work at their homes and refusing to pay for the 
completion of that work. See Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) ("We do not 
believe it would be wise judicial policy to allow one party to create legal liability in 
another by a voluntary exercise of the complaining party's own personal business 
judgment not to seek to protect his rights in the legal forums provided him."). 
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service acts9 is a necessary and appropriate cost of providing temporary labor services. 
III. BRENDA CHAMBERS WAS TRAVELING TO HER DAY'S 
A SSIGNM FNT AND WAS PER FOR MING THE ONLY 
pi S!NFS< n\JDUCTEDR v m : u '"f-V"» \I EMPLOYS !>L 
In Ghersi vs. Salazar, the Utah Supreme Court addressed workers' con ipensation11 
benefits in the context of the provision of temporary labor. The court recognized that an 
employee may have two employers under the loaned employL-L .IOCII HK A \ v. . v\ • i] 
Irmpor.ih hlinii sen i< v is <i 'f'CiiHhil miplo\i I1 iiiinl tin1 busnus In " lin li llir 
employee is assigned is a 'special employer.'" Ghersi v. Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352, 1356 
(Utah lO04N T thi- case. I SI (American States's insured) was Brenda Chambers's 
x -. - hi«; is tn le 
because "[w]hen an e r r ,ec ul a temp T ir- \ ' - ^
 u ; who has ' h - . r 
decline an assignment accents an assignment, [sjhe enters into an implied contract of hire 
with the special employer," "' Ghersi, 883 P.2d at 1357 
Icnipniiin, lahni >.rr\ uvs inv yvw\t\\ rinpli I'I i i \ leinpniai \ l.ihoi m m i in 
9
 See I uttle v. Hi-land Dairyman's Assoc, J:... r... - VOL, 
that a corporation must act in its affairs through its agents ana icpicscnLative:>;. 
11 j
 "Having previously adopted the 'coming and going rule' in worker?' 
compensation cases, we here extend that principle to cases involving third-p ^ v 
negligence actions and hold that generally an employee is not in the scope oi ms 
employment for purposes of third-party negligence claims when he ^ traveling to and 
from work." Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d (>M '>**• M'tah 
1989). 
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the business of furnishing temporary help. LSI maintains an inventory of personnel which 
it supplies to its clients. When the client of a temporary labor service wants an employee 
to perform certain tasks, it calls a temporary labor service — such as LSI. LSI then selects 
an employee from its inventory — such as Brenda Chambers — and offers her the 
temporary job which the temporary employee is free to accept or reject (Brenda Chambers 
accepted her assignment). After the temporary employee accepts the assignment, she 
travels to the premises of the special employer. Thus, the temporary employee's travel to 
the premises of her special employer is the sine qua non of a temporary labor service's 
business. 
The Utah Supreme Court declared that temporary employment services, such as 
LSI, do only one thing — to wit: Provide temporary employees to special employers. 
[A] temporary labor service "does not perform any work for 
customers; it merely supplies or 'loans' workers who are under 
contract to the service to work as an employee for a client." 
Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries. 921 P.2d 456 (Utah 1996) (quoting Ghersi v. Salazar, 
883 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Utah 1994)). Traditionally, workers only have value when — for 
example — they are in the factory actually producing widgets. Therefore the "going-and-
coming" rule developed as a recognition that the typical employer gains nothing from the 
employee's commute from the employee's home.11 
11
 Some courts have focused on the benefit derived by the employee in choosing 
the place to live. The reasoning is that the employee's choice is the reason for the 
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It i tl le ! :ase often lpoi ai y laboi sen Ices, 1 urn e > • si the gei lei: al ei nployei 's woi kei s 
only have value if they arrive at the special employer's premises. Once the temporary 
worker arrives at the special employer's premises, she is loaned to the special employer 
mull I ins ("inislit'ill lii'i ilnlii" Ini the fM.iiettil eniplooi I pom IK'IIIJJ loaned lo Ilk' *>\n:\ i ill 
employer — to continue the example — the temporary worker enters the special 
employer's 'factory and begins to act w ithin the course and scope of her employment with 
her special employer by producing w idgets 
Brenda Chambers' s spinal niiplo\rt IIIIK* l.millill did in 1 benefit Ironi In i 
efforts to arrive at the landfill because she was merel) attempting to-transport herself to 
the lrndfill'" ^ e d locator v, ^ V "" pro\ ide secretarial senices. She was not 
Brenda Chambers "& attempt tu uavc s *™- ' ^ * with the »r><. /.;/ smi >r, / - :. 
within the general guidelines of the "going-and-coming" rule. 
The general employer, on the other hand, conducted the substance of its business 
b' and through Ilinida I h.unhns\ In i1 i I In I IN; IJIIIIIIIII \S pn \iomsl\ Jalul 1 Ml IIIUH'S 
nothing but loan its employees to special employers and cause those employees to show up 
at its clients' places of business. Once LSI's employee arrives at its client's place of 
business, its K on: k Is done While tra\ i!,,; . , u. in, ut:./.ni: ; .:.. .» . . iiie ,K , uient, 
commute. I herefore, the con lmute dors not seive lo bench! the etiipIo>tT\ pindin In in mil 
widgets, rather it senes to benefit the enij iloyee's eht nee < >1 Li I est} le 
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Brenda Chambers was furthering the endeavor by and through which LSI stays in 
business. 
IV. BRENDA CHAMBERS1 S TRIP WAS NOT A SIMPLE 
COMMUTE, RATHER HER TRAVEL WAS THE ESSENCE OF 
HER DUTIES AS LSI'S EMPLOYEE. 
Brenda Chambers was traveling directly to the landfill at the time of the accident 
approximately one hour after having received a call from LSI requesting that she work on 
a Saturday. She was performing LSFs only business. Under Utah law, Ms. Chambers 
was within the course and scope of her employment because her "purpose or intent, 
however misguided in its means, [was] to further [her general] employer's business 
interests." Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989). 
Employees who travel on behalf of their employer are not outside the course and 
scope of their employment. The Utah Court of Appeals has acknowledged the traveling 
employee rule12 which provides that: 
employees whose work entails travel away from the employer's 
premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be within the 
course of their employment continuously during the trip, except when 
a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown. 
Buczvnski v. Industrial Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1169 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 1A Arthur 
12
 This rule was adopted in worker's compensation cases. There is no reason to 
believe that such a rule would not be applicable to respondeat superior cases. It is, at 
least, instructive with respect to the implementation of the "scope of employment" rule. 
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I .arson & I .ex K 1 arson, I he Law of Workmen 's Compensation § 25.00 (1996)). 
Brenda Chambers ' s conduct falls within the s^ope **f he? employment: (1.) the 
employee \ *_ on duct mu c 1 M the general kmo lie ,.  mpioyee b. employed to perform. * 1) 
ordinary- sp-uial boundaries of the employment; and (3) the employee 's conduct must be 
motivated. ,u least in part, by the purpose of serving the emplo\er s interest Birkner v. 
Salt Lake i ountv ; 71 I: 2< I 1053. 1056-5' 7 (I Jtah 1989 . ^ .;.... v hui.u.cis conduct fits 
IHMIII . into (Mi lii t nlrrmii 
A . Brent i a C n a m n e r s . s I r a v t i U- *nc P r e m i s e s ol t h e Spec ia l 
E m p l o y e r NX a- !h< O e n c r a i k ^ u l •>! VC ' **i.- '^v. A J> Min-i! 
t o P e r f o r m 
Brenda CI: mn ].••* • to tl ic: pi ei i rises of I ic: i special smploj en: w 'as i lot a t) pical 
daily commute; rathei, u wa& the substance o f L S F s business. Brenda Chambers was 
performing the general work she was hired to perfbmi for LSI as opposed to being wholl) 
in/v ol/v ed in a personal endeavor. In other words, Brenda Chambers was delivering a 
lempomrv Lihoivi to the pinii iscs of the s p a lal employer 's business 
B . T h e M r u d u r e of T e m p o r a r y E m p l o y m e n t is ^ K h h a t 
O r d i n a r y S p a t i a l Bo*:r»ii, r ies Are the T\ '»atl \ \a\- L e a d i n g 
t o tin* P r c i n i H ^ ol Spec ia l E m p l o y e r s . 
. • : Defendant aigiinl that llniuda ( l ia i t ibus ' s negligence ili«I mil Like plan e al in near 
the landfill — the special employer. Defendant sir \>red Brenda Chambers ' s 
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relationship with LSI — her general employer. 
At the risk of belaboring the point, Brenda Chambers was performing LSI's only 
business activity. In temporary employment, there is no such thing as a fixed place of 
employment or set hours.13 
The spatial boundaries and ordinary hours requirement was best explained by the 
Utah Supreme Court in its analysis of a California case involving a rural deliveryman. See 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989) (citing Moeller v. 
De Rose. 222 P.2d 107 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950)). The California court declined to apply 
the general "going-and-coming" rule to a rural deliveryman, stating:. 'That rule is 
applicable where the employee is required to perform services at a fixed place on 
particular premises...." The court, in Whitehead, distinguished between the job of an 
office worker who traveled to a fixed location every day, and the job of a rural 
deliveryman whose main service to his employer is traveling. 
[The California decision concerned] a rural deliveryman who was 
involved in an accident while completing his rounds making 
collections. Unlike [the tortfeasor in Whitehead], he had no office, 
and unlike [Whitehead], the accident did not occur during a daily 
commute between home and his [fixed] place of work. 
Id. Brenda Chambers, like the rural deliveryman in California, was not involved in a 
13
 The Restatement to which the Utah Supreme Court referred in developing the 
three-part scope of employment analysis provides that conduct is within the scope of 
employment if "(b) it occurs within authorized time and space limits." Restatement 
(Second) Agency § 288(l)(b). 
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typical daily commute to a fixed premises. The only work Brenda Chambers ever 
performed for her general employer, 1 SI, was t»- mw -.-1 at T.sT - request in rrk-r m arrive 
at her assignment. 
Because Brnula ( himihiT-i IMII no liixol nlln i null no IIMMI hours, sin \as not 
inv oived in a tj pical daily commute between home and work. Rather she was performing 
her work "substantially within" the ordinary spatial boundaries. 
. • • ' C Brenda Chambers's lra\ el to the J .aiidiili VC as Motivated 
by Her' J )esire to Serve i ler ( ienerai fcmployer 
Brenda Chambers was not purchasing nylons at the time of the collision. She had 
completed her purchase r.-.J -a- \ .ueling diieciK t 'h*. \rndf1! Defendant presents no 
fact that coiiti adicts or c . , ; : . ^ i' .. JS -'* sworn testimony 'n^< * purpose 
01 intent. how e * ei misg • • . . . • , . 
business interests." Birkner v. Salt Lake County 7. : l\2d 105 J, Ko7 ^Ltah 1989). 
Brenda Chambers was called at home by her employer and was instructed to 
iiinii'tiiafuleh IMM 1 In In mi ii.ssifjini n ml I >i Ilk din Sin Inii i in;dl\
 tt«o( \ leaned up and 
dressed in order to arrive on time as LSI requested. Her actions were performed for the 
benefit of her employer and in obedience to its directions. Therefore, Brenda Chambers's 
negligent act was w itliiii the course and scope of her employment, and she i> \mr? ^ 
Status's insiih'd. . - • 
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V. THE ANALYSIS SET FORTH BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
IN DRAKE, DEMONSTRATES THAT BRENDA CHAMBERS'S 
TRAVEL WAS WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HER 
EMPLOYMENT WITH HER GENERAL EMPLOYER — LSI. 
In Drake, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's holding that Ms. 
Drake's commute home started after she left the Ogden office of FHP (where she made a 
delivery). It is important to understand that Ms. Drake was within the course and scope of 
her employment while traveling from Salt Lake to FHP in Ogden, but not while traveling 
from FHP in Ogden to her home in Ogden because the Ogden delivery had become a 
regular part of Ms. Drake's employment instead of being a deviation from a "going and 
coming" commute or a "special errand" as the Court of Appeals had ruled.14 The Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the following test to the facts surrounding Ms. Drake's travel to 
determine whether Ms. Drake's travel fell within the "going and coming" rule or whether 
her travel constituted a "special errand." 
First, "if [the journey] is relatively regular, whether every day, . . . or at frequent 
intervals,... the case begins with a strong presumption that the employee's going and 
coming trip is expected to be no different from that of any other employee with reasonably 
regular hours and place of work." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) 
14
 It should be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled that Mrs. Drake's travel was 
within the course and scope of her employment from the office to her house and its 
reasoning was not challenged; rather, the Supreme Court ruled that a more deferential 
appellate standard of review was appropriate. 
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(nm/iiii.- aiouii ; i-uv^ vi u oiMiicit .) v wiiipu,>aiiun ; ' 
208.24 to 4 2U8.20;. AL>. Drake had made the bjiiic .up two 01 three times per week lor 
several months, Brenda Chambers, on the other hand, had never worked at the landfill 
before she was called on the day of the accident and asked to w ork there 
Second 111*" i rhi tni hii i i lnini li>m iiniismssn | nl Ihr | u i m m nn tlir i inplnsn* 
should be compared with the extent oi the task to be performed at the end of the journey 
for the general employer. Id. (citing Larson § 16,13, at 4-208,26) Brenda Hiambers was 
i lot going to pei foi i t I an> • : i k fc i the general en iplo;; ei (I SI) \ ( 1: 
landfill. Hie essence of Brenda Chambers ' s service for LSI was the making * the 
journey. When she arriv ed at the premises of the special employer, she would begin 
working loi da. ^peciai employer. 
1 ' .;• IIUM '^I at Ihc assignment Itoiu Ihe general ei :t lploy ei si ion ild be: 
considered i he Utah Supreme Court stated that "if an employee must suddenly drop 
everything U) travel at th«. "treneral] employer 's request, that indicates that the travel itself 
could be part *--- ?he b e m ^ !C:IUL»,U .,; t'.,,, ..*. * .iiu.^rs was cai .ui ui; „ vmn \ iy at 
8:00 a i n and aske - * ^ ti i. 
i:
 "One i ousness" includes the length oitne journey, conditions oi trav el, time ol 
day , day of 1 < eek, and any other circumstance^ "ndc- t,-Vii ,u tU • •• — -.
 r i ; 1 ]c \K\ 
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VI. ANOTHER TEMPORARY EMPLOYEE WOULD HAVE BEEN 
SENT TO THE LANDFILL IF BRENDA CHAMBERS HAD NOT 
ACCEPTED THE ASSIGNMENT. 
The district court erred in its formulation of the question presented to it. The proper 
formulation is not: "Was the person traveling from her home to a workplace?" Rather, the 
question is: "Was the employee's travel beneficial to the general employer and its 
business?" The answer is, unequivocally, yes. Distinguishing between that which is 
personal and that which is business-related is aided by the following analysis: 
In situations where the scope of employment issue concerns an 
employee's trip, a useful test in determining if the transaction of 
business is purely incidental to a personal motive is "whether the 
trip is one which would have required the employer to send 
another employee over the same route or to perform the same 
function if the trip had not been made." 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991) (quoting Whitehead v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins.. 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989)); see also Birkner v. Salt Lake 
County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-58 (Utah 1989). 
In order to stay in business, a temporary employee must arrive at the special 
employer's premises to perform services for the general employer's client or the 
temporary employer does not get paid. A temporary employment agency is in the business 
of delivering workers to its clients. Thus, temporary employees who deliver themselves to 
the premises of a special employer are not commuting to their fixed place of employment 
with their general employer; rather, they are performing their general employer's business 
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h\ u>mnuitmj» In Ihr spn u l r m p l u w i '.business. 
LSI was required to send a temporary employee to its client. If it had not sent 
Brenda Chambers, it would have needed to send somebody else. Brenda Chambers's trip 
a personal decision. 
The character of Brenda C h a m b e r ^ jnumes was colored, from beginning to end, 
by the employer-imposeu acquirement 01 wLuvUing ^usUl U- -.-e landfill and making it 
l lhnv \s 11 In 11 .111 liiHii iiiiiill I in in" •lull I" c 
cannot be stated too often: Brenda Chambers's travci to mc landfill was the raison d }etre] } 
of LSFs business. 
V - *-: :>iiV i ,w A^ORDERORRt^L i^ l r t iM-M vh/ . r> 
, i i i i A i li ALSI1UATIONFROM IHF APPI !i \ m u ^ MP 
THE "GOING-AND-COMING" RULL. 
As prev iously explained, LSI contacted Brenda Chambers at home and directed her 
to travel to the landfill Once an employer commands an employee to take a certain 
scope of her eraplo) ineiit. Fhe supreme court has approvingly referred to the following 
rule: 
1 he i i lie v yhich emerges is that when the employee engages in a 
1
 y:.!.,;. KA:.LLVV_ ^ i l l t y Cai e \ , Pette> , 94 = I S ^ S 2< 1 52 4 52 7( \ i 1 195 • ; ). 
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special activity which is within the course of his employment, and 
which is reasonably undertaken at the request or invitation of the 
employer, any injury suffered while traveling to and from the place 
of such activity is also within the course of employment and is 
compensable. 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (quoting Dimmig v. 
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. 495 P.2d 433, 439 (Cal. 1972)). 
VIII. BRENDA CHAMBERS'S DEVIATION TO BUY NYLONS DID 
NOT TAKE HER OUTSIDE THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HER 
EMPLOYMENT. 
In Larson's treatise at § 17.02[5], Larson addresses the factual situation at issue. 
Brenda Chambers originated at her home to make a special errand for LSI. Brenda 
Chambers's destination was interrupted by a personal errand17 to purchase nylons. After 
the errand was completed, but before she returned to the route that would have been 
taken,18 Brenda Chambers's caused an accident. Larson states that the accident in this 
situation is a hazard of the job and is subject to "the clearest kind of coverage." Id. 
17
 For the sake of argument only and not as an admission that her purchase of 
nylons was, in fact a "personal errand." 
18
 Again, it is assumed that she was not fully back to the route she would have 
taken only for the sake of argument. 
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IX. IHhMODLRN lRliND DIFFERS 1-RoM i nL Miu- iv^Os 
DECISIONS RELIED UPON BY AMERICAN STATES. 
For the foregoing reasons, courts in other states have found temporary employees to 
be within the course and scope of their employment when traveling to their temporary 
iissijanmt'iil i "' In l^1-! I lit I ntiisihtiui mint ml .t|»peak determined lli.il a lcni|u>i,n', 
employee who followed his general employer's instructions to travel to the premises of his 
special employer was w ithin the course and scope of his employment when he was 
it 1 vob • eel in ai 1 at ito accident See Jackson \ ^ong. _**••*:_. ^ - •:.. a:. /, 
the Pennsylvania Si lpreme Court held tl~ - * 
employment, but rather worked for a temporary labor service, was furthering her general 
employer's business by traveling to her temporary assignment. Thus, the court held that 
Ilk1 lempomi \ muse 's miui ics susLiiiinl v\ 11ile 
19
 American States dismisses the better-reasoned cases by the conclusory assertion 
that "those are workers' compensation cases." I Jtah courts, on the other hand, have noted 
that the "going-and-coming" rule was developed in w orkers' compensation cases and 
ii nported into cases arising under the doctrine of respondeat superior More importantly: 
A ru .iv. , whether preexisting or newly establish 
as thi . -.4|or premise of an adjudicatory syllogism, necessarih 
go\ ems all subsequent cases properly falling within the scope of the 
rule, ["his is so even when the particulai tacts in subsequent cases are 
different and res judicata does not ip-
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel, 846 F.2d .J4:-ii uin 
reasoning of the cases cited by Windsor is sound and American States s ut, M 
distinguish them on the basis of immaterial facts is not well-taken 
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sustained within the course and scope of her employment. Peterson v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Bd.. 597 A.2d 1116, 1120 (Pa. 1991). 
The modem trend of courts is to adopt the analysis presented by Windsor. In 
addition to the 1991 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case and the 1974 Louisiana court of 
appeals case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the Supreme Court of Arkansas and an 
appellate court in Ohio all recognize the special employer/general employer distinction 
that is based upon the fact that a temporary employee's travel to the special employer is 
the essence of the temporary employee's service to the general employer. See Olsten-
Kimberlv Quality Care v. Parr. 965 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1998); Olsten Kimberlv Quality Care 
v. Pettev. 944 S.W.2d 524 (Ark. 1997); Durbin v. Ohio Bur. Of Workers' Comp. 677 
N.E.2d 1234 (Ohio App. 1 Dist 1996). 
Brenda Chambers had two employers at the time of the collision. Brenda 
Chambers had no fixed place of employment. The district court agreed with the 
conclusions of the California and Florida courts without analyzing their reasoning and 
without determining whether the reasoning of those courts under the law of those states is 
appropriate under Utah law. 
The California court focused on the incidental benefit to the employer (without 
analyzing the different benefits and interests of special employers and general employers) 
and concluded that the plaintiff in that case did not provide anything special (to which 
employer was unclear). It is important to note that the special employer of the temporary 
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discussion ^ ihwi the tempoiaiy employee had been working at Mitsubishi -.
 t MV * 
significant amount of time See Henderson v, Adia Services. Inc. 227 Cal R~tr n^ nc;l 
employee is essentially a full-time employee for the special employer (the general 
employer ^ ;Me being nn ? -:\ clerical \. n ma\ be reasonable to assert, as the California 
court did utnU Hie fiuh • mat i UM. . that the travel to ;IIL premises of the »LK uii 
general employer. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
Brenda t "hambers, on the other hand, was called on a Saturday at approximately 
! '•'( AU\ c i i ^ a ^ c a t u U m u n ,.i..*,:<. . - urenda t hampers iJep* an:, i 
started her travel from hei house (because that ia how LSi decided lo ruu it-
 waiii;^M„ 
therefore, the Defendant's insistence that Brenda Chambers was merely commuting is 
1
 mi 111 in mi I i iii" il i iii I in legal iiippnil Mini inipni laulK I l^i ,il\\ >n « (old Bitiitia l lufiibiT-
w h e n and where to travel and had to appear at her special emp1-- ^  e-' - premises at a certain 
time. Brenda Chambers's travel was required by her employment, and Defendant's 
21
 * The "outside employee' " vs. ""inside employee" distiiKnon merely means nut me 
outside employee does not provide services at a fixed situs w>v- <::r *ir i^sHr ~rH *• :*: ^ 
your typical office worker or factory worker 
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deliberate ignorance regarding Ms. Chambers's chosen method or route of travel does not 
transform its core business function into Brenda Chambers's personal errand or 
impenetrable legal immunity. A traveling employee is acting within the course and scope 
of her employment from portal to portal and no artificial distinctions may be superimposed 
onto that legal status by this Defendant's repetition of its assertion that LSI refused to pay 
its employees for performing its core work. 
The Florida court's decision fares no better under a reasoned analysis and 
comparison of the facts of this case with Utah law and general scope of employment 
principles. The Florida court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the temporary 
employee called Manpower instead of Manpower calling the temporary employee. See 
Freeman v. Manpower, Inc., 453 So.2d 208, 210 (Fla. App. 1984). More important to this 
discussion, that court stated that irregularity and suddenness of an assignment almost 
always qualifies a trip as exempt from the "going and coming" rule. Id. 
X. PAYMENT OR NON-PAYMENT FOR TIME AND MILEAGE IS 
NOT MATERIAL TO WHETHER BRENDA CHAMBERS'S 
CONDUCT WAS WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HER 
EMPLOYMENT WITH LSI. 
Brenda Chambers was not being paid for her time or her mileage while traveling to 
the premises of her special employer, but that distinction is nothing more than an assertion 
that LSI's refusal to pay employees for their services insulates it from any vicarious 
liability for acts taken at its behest (i.e., a very, very cheap insurance policy). It would be 
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strange, indeed, to hold that the employer may be permitted to profit from its own wrong.11 
Presumably, the desired response to such an assertion is a conclusion that payment 
or non-payment determines a master's right to control the servant and, thus, determii les 
cannot be drawn because there is no requirement of consideration in order for an emrun ec 
t^ K A ithin the course and ^cope of her jmplov mv\/< See. e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Layton, 
;• ^ , * <•' . ;.* . .^piuniiiiL. ..-: necessarythat ar icia • 
The fact that Brenda Chambers was not paid for her services-is not controlling and 
is such a circumstance as may be disregarded since .il1 the rrthcr evidence points to the 
conclusion that she w as acting .• , iiiplo^iv «i . * .A . .on "I he ( ; :n 11 t 
n lay consider the intent of the j •• ' • -1 Ihr biiisiiK " '! •> * -^ idditioi 11 : • 
compensation, direction, and control _-:-J "no single factor is complete!) controlling." 
Close ex rel. Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Recreational Ass'n. 845 P.2d 242, 244 
(I Ml i 1/992) 
Brenda Chambers "was performing for [her general] emp^ver a substantial service 
required by [her] employment at the place and in the manner so required " Moser v. 
Such J holding wouid permit LSI L-.- ^ ..,.. 
( < ; D I . A ^ \ - r !?a-301(2)0^ requiring liah , ! i t ' "• 
public. 
usiness wiinout oi-c\ing ' ; \H 
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Industrial Commission, 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968). Brenda Chambers was called at home 
by her employer and was instructed to travel to her assignment for the day. She hurnedly 
got cleaned up and dressed in order to arrive on time as LSI requested. Her actions were 
performed for the benefit of her employer and in obedience to its directions. Therefore, 
Brenda Chambers's negligent act was within the course and scope of her employment, and 
she is American States's insured. 
XL THE FOUR-YEAR, PERSONAL-INJURY STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DOES NOT GOVERN AMERICAN STATES'S 
OBLIGATIONS ON ITS WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
Windsor adopts the arguments set forth in its memorandum in opposition to 
American States's motion for summary disposition. The district court's alternative 
holding that the negligence statute of limitations is a time-bar to recovering from 
American States's under the terms of its written contract is abjectly erroneous. 
XII. UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY EXPRESSED BY THE FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY STATUTE CREATED, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, AN IMPLIED CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY BETWEEN 
AMERICAN STATES AND WINDSOR. 
Windsor 's right of indemnification arises from the fact that it was compelled by the 
Financial Responsibility statute22 to pay American States's obligation, and if Windsor's 
22
 An "uninsured motorist" includes someone who has insurance but whose 
"coverage for an accident is disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305(2)(c). 
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right of indemnification were denied, such action would unjustly enrich23 American States. 
Utah's automobile insurance regime is sometimes referred to as owners or 
operators security and consists of, in general terms, liability coverage, no-fault (i.e., PIP 
coverage), uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and property damage coverage. 
These coverages (whether addressed collectively or individually) have been referred to 
herein as the "Financial Responsibility" statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41 -12a-101. 
The comprehensive automobile insurance regime was initiated in the early 1970s 
and arose out of Utah's public policy favoring the protection of innocent victims by 
23
 Quantum meruit has two branches, both rooted injustice. See Scheller v. Dixie 
Six Corp.. 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988). The remedy provided under quantum 
meruit is one of restitution designed to restore to a plaintiff a benefit unjustly enjoyed by 
a defendant. See Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings. Inc. v. Adams. 564 P.2d 773, 
776 (Utah 1977). 
A. Unjust Enrichment. 
Windsor may prevail on an unjust enrichment theory by proving three elements: 
'"(1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by 
the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the 
benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the 
benefit without payment of its value.'" American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI 
Mechanical Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
B. Contract Implied In Fact. 
The second branch of quantum meruit, contract implied in fact, is an actual 
contract established by conduct. See Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 
1987). The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant requested the 
plaintiff to provide services; (2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate it for 
those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff 
expected compensation. Id (noting that implied contracts impose contractive duty by 
reason of promissory expression and are no different than express contracts, although 
different in mode of expressing assent, quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 18 
(1963)). 
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requiring all motorists to maintain required coverages. By enacting the Financial 
Responsibility Act (formerly the Safety Responsibility Act), the Legislature expressed its 
"interest in creating a more efficient process for liquidating personal injury claims and 
providing an incentive for persons driving Utah's highways to obtain motor vehicle 
insurance." Warren v. Melville. 937 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1980) (stating that in coupling Utah's no-fault statute 
with the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, "the obvious legislative intent was to 
encourage compliance with the security provisions of the act.")). 
The adoption of the Financial Responsibility statute "substantially changed the 
public policy of this state by mandating that all Utah automobiles be covered by certain 
types of security." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) 
(invalidating a household exclusion clause below statutory minimums after the enactment 
of mandatory automobile liability insurance). The Call court rejected the argument that it 
should adopt the conclusions arrived at by foreign courts "since they were decided prior to 
the enactment of the no-fault automobile insurance laws and the requirement of mandatory 
automobile insurance." Id; see also Dairvland Insurance Co. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737 
(Utah 1982) (refusing to recognize follow Utah caselaw pre-dating the legislature's 
enactment of the Financial Responsibility statute). 
The comprehensive and mandatory nature of modern insurance law establishes an 
interrelationship between formerly unrelated entities. The relationship that is relevant to 
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this Motion is the UM carrier's provision of liability coverage to uninsured motorists.24 
Because the Financial Responsibility statute sets forth UM coverage as a required piece of 
the interdependent puzzle, uninsured motorists implicitly enter into a contractual 
relationship with the UM carrier that acts on behalf of the uninsured motorist. Were it not 
so, people like Brenda Chambers and insurers like American States would be encouraged 
to refuse to comply with the security provisions of the Financial Responsibility statute in 
violation of the central legislative purpose thereof. 
UM coverage is only provided because of the uninsured motorist's fault in failing 
to maintain liability coverage or the liability carrier's refusal to fulfill its obligations. For 
the foregoing reasons, among others, an implied contract arises, as a matter of law, at the 
time a payment is made under UM coverage. No similar implied contract arises from 
payments under collision coverage, comprehensive coverage, or PIP coverage because the 
payments under those coverages are to be paid by the first-party insurer without regard to 
the liability of the tortfeasor and without regard to the tortfeasor's maintenance of 
mandatory coverage.25 
24
 See Restatement of Restitution, Title A, Indemnity at p. 328 (setting forth the 
"multiple sureties" rule); see also Id. at p. 348, Illustration 6 involving a suretyship 
relationship and the applicable statute of limitations). 
25
 When an insurer seeks reimbursement of benefits paid under coverages other 
than UM coverage, the amount of reimbursement is properly determined according to 
principles of subrogation (i.e., tort principles and comparative negligence). However, 
indemnity requires "full reimbursement" of the amount of loss paid (of course, a UM 
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XIII. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE UNINSURED MOTORIST 
STATUTE AND THE REST OF THE FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY STATUTE GIVES RISE TO AN IMPLIED 
CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY. 
Utah's public policy and statutory enactments require all motorists to maintain a 
minimum amount of liability insurance for the protection of innocent victims. This public 
policy would be frustrated if uninsured motorists were permitted to freely demand a 
defense and indemnification under the uninsured motorist coverage purchased by their 
victims or if primary carriers were encouraged to refuse payment of required benefits to 
their insureds. Therefore, an uninsured motorist's primary insurer must fully reimburse26 a 
claim is adjusted under tort principles and invoking apportionment under the comparative 
negligence statute) because it is an action on a contract. When the amount of 
reimbursement for benefits paid under other coverages is determined by the entry of a 
judgment against the shared insured, an action for indemnity can be brought by the 
secondary insurer against the primary insurer. 
26
 Conceptually, it is instructive to consider the implied contract of indemnity and 
subsequent full reimbursement as the belated payment of insurance premiums by the 
"uninsured motorist." All motorists are required to maintain pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-12a-301(2). Normally, an insured pays a premium for an insurance policy. 
This premium is calculated by the actuarial determination of the pooled risk of certain 
events occurring to a group of persons covered by the insurance policy. Therefore, the 
premiums are low. However, insurance purchased subsequent to the happening of an 
event will reflect the true cost of the loss rather than the anticipated cost of the loss 
combined with the risk of loss. Therefore, the contract of implied indemnity arises out of 
Utah's mandatory automobile liability insurance scheme requiring the purchase of 
insurance. Full reimbursement is just another way of expressing the cost of purchasing 
insurance to cover an event that has already happened where the costs and expenses are 
already determined. 
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UM carrier that provides insurance for the uninsured motorist lest the uninsured motorist 
and her insurer become freeloaders. If freeloaders were not required to indemnify those 
who have paid their obligations, the freeloaders would be provided an incentive to refrain 
from maintaining insurance or paying insurance benefits. The present system of insurance 
would crumble under the weight of individual and corporate freeloaders. 
Where, under the direction of statute, an insurance company acts in the place of an 
uninsured motorist, it is upon the implicit and equitable assumption that the UM carrier is 
to be indemnified by the uninsured motorist or their liability carrier for expenses incurred 
and payments made in the course of the transaction. The duty to indemnify is imposed 
(without respect to the indemnitor's acknowledgment of the duty) unless there is an 
express agreement to the contrary. The Restatement of Restitution states the general rule 
as follows: 
A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is 
owed by him but which as between himself and another should have 
been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from the other . 
Restatement of Restitution, Title A, Indemnity at § 76; see also Hanover Limited v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co.. 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting § 76 of the Restatement). 
A. The Role or Tne Uninsured Motorist Carrier. 
Windsor would not have owed any duty to its insured, Kathryn Zaborski, for her 
general damages and medical bills in excess of $3,000 were it not for American States's 
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failure to provide liability insurance. Windsor's duty arose because of American States's 
fault (i.e., its unlawful failure to comply with the requirements of the Financial 
Responsibility statute). Windsor defended American States's insured against the claims 
made by Windsor's insured because its duties were exactly coextensive with American 
States's duties. The Utah Supreme Court explained the nature of uninsured motorist 
coverage and the relationship between UM carriers and uninsured motorists in Chatterton 
vs. Walker as follows: 
The district court's attempt to enforce distinctions between [the 
uninsured motorist's] interests and [the UM carrier's] interests thus 
served no valid end. "The purpose of mandatory uninsured-motorist 
insurance is 'protection equal to that which would be afforded if the 
offending motorist carried liability insurance. . . . The insurer 
stands in the shoes of the uninsured motorist and must pay if [the 
uninsured motorist] would be required to pay.'" Fetch, 530 N.W.2d 
at 339 {quoting 8C John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance 
Law and Practice, § 5086, at 307, 309-10). 
Chatterton v. Walker. 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997) (discussing the right of a UM carrier to 
intervene in insured's action against uninsured motorist) (footnotes, etc. omitted, emphasis 
added). In other words, Windsor's obligations toward its insured as the substitute liability 
carrier for Brenda Chambers was exactly coextensive with the duties owed by American 
States and only arose because of its failure to provide liability coverage or a defense for 
Brenda Chambers. 
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XIV. PRINCIPLES OF IMPLIED INDEMNITY ARE PROPERLY 
APPLIED TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UM 
CARRIER AND THE LIABILITY CARRIER. 
As a preliminary matter, Windsor acknowledges that there is no reported appellate 
case in the State of Utah which directly addresses the interplay between the doctrine of 
implied indemnity and the uninsured motorist statute. However, Utah has adopted the 
common law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1 (1996) (adopting common law as rule of 
decision in Utah courts). And courts in other states have applied the doctrine of implied 
indemnity to uninsured motorist coverage. See, e ^ , Coleman v. American Manufacturers 
Mutual Insurance Co., 930 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (anticipating Mississippi law); 
See also Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.. 471 F.Supp. 1059 
(M.D. Penn. 1979) (acknowledging the right of a UM carrier to sue a liability carrier and 
collect full reimbursement without respect to the liability carrier's coverage limits based 
upon the doctrine of equitable indemnification under § 76 of the Restatement where the 
liability carrier wrongfully denied coverage to its insured causing the UM carrier to step 
into the breach caused by the liability carrier's wrongful conduct and to pay its insured 
under its uninsured motorist coverage). 
First, Windsor discharged a legal obligation governed by UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 31A-22-305 and its insurance policy under which it was obligated (coextensively with 
American States, but contingent upon its failure to provide liability insurance) to pay the 
liability of Brenda Chambers for its insured's damages. Second, American States was also 
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liable (coextensively with Windsor, but American States's obligation was primary) to pay 
the damages suffered by Kathryn Zaborski. Third, as between American States and 
Windsor, the obligation should be paid (should have been paid originally27) by American 
States. See Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green. Inc.. 740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 
1987); Perrv v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984). 
Therefore, Windsor's cause of action for indemnification began to run when it 
settled Kathryn Zaborski's claim for damages on or about May 14, 1994. This lawsuit was 
filed on April 3, 1998; therefore, it was filed well within the four-year statute of limitation 
applicable to implied contracts. 
XV. WINDSOR IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT 
WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FULL REIMBURSEMENT, 
INCLUDING COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. 
Windsor is entitled to recover its costs and attorney fees from American States: 
[I]f the party secondarily liable on an obligation is obliged to pay the 
obligation, he is entitled to full reimbursement from the party 
primarily liable. 
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 20, page 595. And full reimbursement includes costs and attorney 
fees because Windsor is entitled to be saved harmless. "An indemnitee is not 'held 
27
 It is the very nature of uninsured motorist coverage to be secondary. In other 
words, Windsor's obligation to indemnify American States's insured would not have 
arisen had American States fulfilled its obligation to provide liability insurance (i.e., 
Windsor's obligation would not have arisen in the absence of American States's fault). 
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harmless' . . . if it must incur expenses to vindicate its rights." Hanover Limited v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988) (permitting recovery of attorney fees 
incurred in connection with defending against secondary liability, but denying an 
indemnitee attorney fees incurred in connection with enforcing the implied indemnity 
contract): see also South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Utah App. 1988); 
Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992) (explaining that the award of attorney 
fees as consequential damages, outside the context of statutory and contractual 
authorization — including implied contractual authorizations such as explained above — 
should be limited to two situations: insurance contracts and the third-party exception). 
Windsor is entitled to its attorney fees under the implied contract and the other two 
theories. 
First, this is an insurance dispute where American States breached its fiduciary duty 
to defend Brenda Chambers. Windsor may enforce the rights of Brenda Chambers. See 
Auerbach Co. v. Key Sec. Police. Inc.. 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984) (explaining that a one 
who has a judgment against a judgment debtor may enforce the rights of the judgment 
debtor). 
Under the circumstances of this case, attorney fees may be considered an item of 
consequential damages. See Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 419-20 (Utah 
1989). Attorney fees are recoverable if they were "reasonably within the contemplation 
of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the [implied] contract was made." 
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Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 
This litigation is a "natural consequence" or a "reasonably foreseeable" result of 
American States's breach of its fiduciary obligations. It falls under the maxim that every 
man (or woman or insurance company) must be held to intend the natural and probable 
consequence of his deeds. 
Second, the third-party tort rule provides for an award of attorney fees. The Utah 
Court of Appeals described the rule as follows: 
[W]hen the natural consequences of one's negligence is another's 
involvement in a dispute with a third party, attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in resolving the dispute are recoverable from the negligent 
party[28] as an element of damages. 
South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, Brenda Chambers negligently injured Kathryn Zaborski while Ms. 
Chambers was performing the business of her employer. Under these circumstances, 
litigation with Ms. Chambers's employer's insurance company is a natural consequence29 
28
 Technically, the attorney fees are recoverable from Brenda Chambers. 
Although a separate civil number exists for the judgment against Brenda Chambers, a 
court of equity may impose the attorney fees that she would owe in determining the 
extent of American States's obligation. 
29
 The Utah Supreme Court has used the phrase "natural consequence" to denote 
foreseeable result by defining special damages. "Special damages are a particular type of 
damages which are a natural consequence of the injury caused but are not the type of 
damages that necessarily flow from the harmful act." Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 
P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) (citing Cohn v. J.C. Pennev. 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975) 
("Special damages are those which occur as a natural consequence of the harm done but 
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of her negligence. Moreover, the vehicle driven by Brenda Chambers was not insured at 
the time of her accident, therefore, the prospect of third-party litigation becomes not only 
natural; rather it was a foregone conclusion. 
are not so certain to flow therefrom as to be implied in law.") (emphasis added)). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Richards v. Standard Accident 
Ins. Co., 200 P. 1017, 1023 (Utah 1921) {quoting Western Commercial Travelers' Assoc, 
v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)) "defined 'the natural and probable consequence' 
of an act as follows: 'The natural consequence of means used [is] the consequence which 
ordinarily follows from their use~the result which may be reasonably anticipated from 
their use, and which ought to be expected.'" Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F. Supp. 
1270, 1279 (D. Utah 1995) {quoting Richards, 200 P. at 1023) (alteration in original) 
(anticipating Utah law in defining "accident" as used in homeowner's policy). 
In addition, in Pacific Coast, the defendant had issued a bond indemnifying 
plaintiff title company from any loss resulting from defaults by a builder, the Court 
examined the rule for recovering damages for breach of contract and its emphasis on 
foreseeability. The Court concluded with this analysis: 
[I]t could reasonably be foreseen that the natural and usual 
consequence of Cassady's failure to pay the laborers and 
materialmen would bring about the series of events which occurred: 
that liens would be filed and legal proceedings instituted to enforce 
them; that plaintiff Title Company, having the duty to keep the titles 
clear, would interpose defenses and attend to some disposition of the 
claims, which would require the services of attorneys.... 
Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Ind. Co.. 325 P.2d 906, 908 (Utah 
1958). The same analysis applies to the instant case as was employed in Pacific Coast — 
Windsor's employment of attorneys to sue American States was a natural consequence of 
Brenda Chambers's negligence. Therefore, equity demands that its attorney fees be 
recoverable from American States. 
43 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Brenda Chambers's travel on behalf of LSI was undertaken within the course and 
scope of her employment. Because Brenda Chambers's negligent actions occurred within 
the course and scope of her employment, Brenda Chambers was an insured under LSI's 
insurance policy which was underwritten by American States. Because American States 
owed liability coverage to Brenda Chambers, it must indemnify Windsor. Windsor paid 
the liability of Brenda Chambers, but the obligation of American States is primary and the 
obligation of Windsor was secondary. 
The Court should reverse the district court's award of a summary judgment to 
American States. Brenda Chambers was acting within the course and scope of her 
employment when she negligently injured Kathryn Zaborski. The negligence statute of 
limitations has nothing to do with the facts of this case. 
In addition, the Court should reverse the district court's denial of Windsor's motion 
for summary judgment. All material facts are undisputed and support a finding that 
Brenda Chambers's travel was within the course and scope of her employment. It is 
undisputed that Brenda Chambers was, therefore, an insured under American States's 
liability coverage. The Court should remand the case to the district court for a 
determination of the amount of attorney fees reasonably incurred by Windsor in bringing 
this indemnification action against American States because of the breach of its 
contractual and fiduciary obligations to its insured. 
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DATED this day of May, 2000. 
CARR& 
fRE f^JTWADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, AUGUST 2, 1999; 10:23 A.M. 
2 HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Let's call the matter of Windsor 
5 Insurance versus American States Insurance. This is case 
6 number 980903520. 
7 Counsel, would you enter your appearances, 
8 please? 
9 MR. WADDOUPS: Trent Waddoups appearing for the 
10 plaintiff, Windsor Insurance. 
11 MR. MORTON: Your Honor, Robert Morton 
12 appearing for American States Insurance. 
13 THE COURT: The parties have filed 
14 cross-motions for summary judgment. I believe, 
15 Mr. Waddoups, you filed the first one, so — 
16 MR. WADDOUPS: Yes, I did. 
17 THE COURT: - the way I propose to proceed is 
18 to allow each side two arguments, and ask the last 
19 argument by Mr. Morton to not include anything about your 
20 motion, Mr. Waddoups, so we can conclude it with that 
21 series of arguments. 
22 MR. WADDOUPS: Okay. I think, first of all, we 
23 ought to address the general, overarching theme of this 
24 lawsuit, what's going on here, because I think it might 
25 have been a little bit obscured. 
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1 I thought it was clear, until I read 
2 Mr. Morton's reply memo to his cross-motion, and at that 
3 point I thought maybe we're not all on the same page. 
4 What this is an issue of is coverage. It's not an issue 
5 of liability; it's an issue of coverage. 
6 What the coverage is dependent upon is whether 
7 the corporation, Labor Services, Inc., the named insured 
8 of American States Insurance — whether the corporation 
9 was deemed in law to have been driving Brenda Chambers' 
10 car at the time of the accident. If it was deemed in law 
11 to have been driving that car, then this is an insurable 
12 event, and American States owed primary coverage for the 
13 liability incurred by the tort-feasor, which was Brenda 
14 Chambers. 
15 Now, this question turns on whether there was a 
16 respondeat superior relationship between Brenda Chambers 
17 and Labor Services, Inc. If so, the Latin phrase qui 
18 facit per alium facit per se — he who does someone 
19 through another is deemed in law to have done it himself. 
20 That's what we're going on here. 
21 So, on the day of this accident, Brenda 
22 Chambers was called at home. Brenda Chambers was asked 
23 whether she would go work at the landfill. She said yes. 
24 She got ready. She hopped in her car. She was driving 
25 to the landfill. She injured Catherine Zaborski. 
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Now, another misconception that I think I need 
to address that American States seemed to have. At one 
point in one of their briefs they seem to acknowledge 
propriety of this lawsuit and the procedural format, and 
basically that all of their objections are not relevant, 
because what they said on page 7 of their memorandum in 
support of their motion for summary judgment, their 
initial memorandum, page 7, near the bottom he says: 
"There is no contractual relationship 
between the parties," 
which ignores, of course, that contractual relationships 
are not important here. 
"This is not a case where a primary 
and secondary insurance company are seeking 
an adjudication of their rights as to who 
should have borne responsibility for the 
defense of a common insured." 
Absolutely wrong. That is a misunderstanding 
of what uninsured-motorist coverage is. This is exactly 
a case of two companies, both obligated to defend Brenda 
Chambers. The privity of contract is absolutely 
irrelevant. It's whether coverage was owed for the 
liability of Brenda Chambers. That's what 
uninsured-motorist coverage is. 
Windsor stepped into the shoes of the uninsured 
3 
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motorist, but what we're saying is that she wasn't 
uninsured. We owed, in essence, secondary coverage to 
Brenda Chambers for her negligence, but American States 
owed primary insurance coverage because she was acting as 
LSI. She was doing LSI's work. 
THE COURT: Let me explore that with you just 
for a moment, Mr. Waddoups. If I understand correctly, 
Mr. Morton has indicated to me that there's no Utah law 
indicating that a temp-services employee is entitled to 
coverage for transportation to the site. But there are 
two cases he provides me, one from Florida, and I forget 
where the other one's from, indicating that other states 
have addressed the issue and have found there is no 
coverage. 
Now, I've read your argument, which is an 
attempt to address factually why the Court should 
consider coverage available and not subject to the normal 
rule of law for employers, but I'm wondering if you have 
any cases that are contrary to the ones that have been 
provided me by Mr. Morton. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Yes. I cited two cases in my 
initial memorandum, and I gave you copies of them. One 
is a Louisiana case from 1974. One was a Pennsylvania 
case from 1995-'92. Both of those cases follow the 
reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court with respect to 
4 
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special employers and general employers. The cases cited 
by Mr. Morton don't make the pivotal distinction between 
general employers and special employers, and that's the 
key factor, and both the Louisiana case and the 
Pennsylvania case did that. And Utah has adopted that 
same idea with respect to special employers and general 
employers. 
And what the argument comes down to is that all 
a temporary-service agency does is send people out to the 
job. That's all they do. They deliver employees to the 
premises of the special employer. If I were suing the 
landfill, Mr. Morton's argument would be completely 
correct, and I have acknowledged as much. 
She was just getting ready to get to the 
landfill to begin providing services for them. Her 
travel between her house and the landfill would have 
served no business purpose for them. If you read 
Mr. Morton's arguments, he just kind of glosses over that 
fact. He says, well, what we have here is — well, let me 
look at the ALR. I've got it highlighted. 
And what those cases said is — they said — 
okay. 
"The court stated" -
this is reading in the ALR cited by Mr. Morton. It says: 
"The court stated that the question 
5 
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involved in the present case was whether 
the employee's trip involved an 
incidental benefit to the employer not 
common to commute trips made by ordinary 
members of the work force." 
I have no problem with that question being the 
pivotal question here. What those cases in California 
and Florida failed to do is distinguish between which 
employer they were talking about. We have two employers 
here, and that cannot be stressed too much. Yes, was it 
just a normal trip to the premises of the special 
employer? Yes. Absolutely. Was it doing the 
fundamental — was Brenda Chambers performing a 
fundamental work of Labor Services, Inc.? The answer to 
that question is yes. 
There's nothing else that LSI does except 
deliver employees. To say that they are not responsible 
for doing the only thing that they do would be absolutely 
absurd, which is why itfs just glossed over in these 
other cases and by American States. And that's what the 
California and the Pennsylvania courts said. 
If you look at the Pennsylvania case that I 
sent with the — 
THE COURT: You didn't send any cases, Counsel. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Yes, I did, with courtesy 
6 
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copies. I submitted them about ten days ago, a stack 
about this big. 
THE COURT: I'm certainly not finding them in 
the file here. 
MR. WADDOUPS: I brought them up here to the 
receptionist's desk but I don't know what happened. 
But anyway, to address your question, the 
Pennsylvania court addressed it. They said: 
"Regardless of this appellee's attempt 
to disguise the true nature of its 
employees' status by assigning them" — 
Well, that's discussing when they assigned 
them, which is not really relevant here. But they go on 
to say: 
"A temporary employee never has a 
fixed place of work. Consequently, when 
the agency employee travels to an 
assigned workplace, the employee is 
furthering the business of the agency." 
That's what it comes down to, is that issue 
right there. No matter how much LSI attempts to disguise 
what their relationship with their employees are by, for 
example, not paying them, that does not give them the 
right to subject the public to all these uninsured 
motorists running around, and then claiming that they 
7 
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1 don't even provide secondary insurance coverages when the 
2 performance of their business injures innocent third 
3 parties. That's what it really comes down to here. 
4 And I'd also refer to the case — the Louisiana 
5 case at page 208, and they addressed the proper issues 
6 also. They said: 
7 "However, this case does not involve 
8 the ordinary employment situation." 
9 See, the coming-and-going rule is only relevant 
10 where a person is traveling to his employment at a fixed 
11 place of employment for fixed hours. In this case, 
12 there's no such thing as a fixed place of employment, no 
13 such thing as fixed hours. In the Louisiana case, the 
14 court said: 
15 "Manpower employed plaintiff not just 
16 as a cook, but as a cook to be dispatched 
17 in accordance with the customer's order. 
18 Furthermore, Manpower received no 
19 contractual fee unless the employee 
20 reached the assigned place and performed 
21 the services. Manpower is thus much more 
22 concerned with the employee getting to 
23 his place of work than was the ordinary 
24 employer, despite the fact that Manpower 
25 had attempted to disassociate itself 
8 
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from any responsibility for transporting 
its employees. Consequently, Manpower's 
employee, while traveling to the assigned 
workplace, was actually furthering his 
employer's business interest, and in that 
respect the trip can be regarded as a 
necessary and required part of his 
employment." 
That's the proper question. Was the work of 
LSI being performed during this travel, or is this a 
typical daily commute? That's the two sides of the coin 
that we're talking about here. And if you read through 
Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries and Garicy v. Salazar, 
Utah courts have set forth very clearly what the 
difference between the two are, that they are two totally 
separate employment relationships at the same time, and 
then you just have to look at fundamental agency 
principles, and it's really just that simple. 
What we - well, I don't know if there are any 
other questions you have on that point of law. I think 
I've -
THE COURT: No. You have made it clear. 
MR. WADDOUPS: I have made it clear what my 
theory is. I will attempt to respond to anything that 
Bob will say in the future on that. 
9 
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1 The second point is, is there a question of 
2 fact raised by the defendant as to whether Brenda 
3 Chambers was actually called and sent to the landfill on 
4 the day of the accident? And American States attempts to 
5 raise a disputed issue by filing an affidavit, but that 
6 affidavit is wholly insufficient to raise a material 
7 fact, because the affidavit only says, "Normally, the 
8 landfill is not open on Saturday. I don't know why an 
9 employee would be called on a Saturday, and I have no 
10 knowledge of anything else, and upon information and 
11 belief/' these sorts of statements. 
12 Those sorts of statements do not present 
13 specific facts that are capable of raising a material 
14 disputed issue, and that is the only evidence they have. 
15 What Windsor has presented, in order to prove the facts 
16 of this case, are Brenda Chambers' express testimony that 
17 she was called, that she was sent there, that she was 
18 driving directly to the landfill at the time of this 
19 accident. And simply saying, "Hrarn, as far as we know, it 
20 didn't happen," that's not enough to raise a material 
21 disputed issue. Therefore, the facts are undisputed in 
22 this case. 
23 There is a second way of looking at this, and 
24 I've included that in my initial memorandum. It's a lot 
25 simpler, and it really gets beyond all of this 
10 
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going-and-coming rule, because the going-and-coming rule 
just never comes into play in this case. We've addressed 
it a lot, and I don't want to give it too much credence 
by spending too much time on it because it really never 
comes into play in this case. 
She's not commuting to LSI. She is traveling 
to her employer. The fact that she started at home is 
not material. She was called at home. She was asked to 
take this job, and she immediately traveled there to 
deliver herself. And after delivering herself, then she 
transferred her employment over to the special employer, 
or would have, had she arrived* 
But if you go back to the beginning, where she 
was called at home, she was called and asked to report to 
the landfill to work for the special employer on that 
day. In Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah, the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed a rule that has the most 
applicability in this case. The rule which emerges is: 
"When the employee engages in a 
special activity which is within the 
course of his employment, and which is 
reasonably undertaken at the request or 
invitation of the employer, any injury 
suffered while traveling to and from 
the place of such activity is also 
11 
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1 within the course of employment and is 
2 compensable." 
3 That's what happened here. The fact that she 
4 was not on the premises of LSI at the time she was called 
5 has absolutely no relevance. That is only relevant to 
6 the general business structure that LSI chose to employ. 
7 But just because it chooses to employ that certain 
8 business structure does not insulate them from liability. 
9 Just because they choose to not pay their employees while 
10 they're doing their business does not insulate them from 
11 liability towards innocent third parties that their 
12 employees are likely to injure. 
13 That's the point here. They called her. They 
14 asked her to do something on their behalf, report to this 
15 employer so that we can make a living. She was driving 
16 there, and she injured an innocent third party. That 
17 invokes the insurance coverage of American States' 
18 insurance policy, which, of course, is primary over 
19 Windsor's uninsured-motorist coverage. 
20 But both of those are to insure the tort-feasor 
21 for the benefit of the injured victim. Therefore, what 
22 you have is two insurance companies with a duty to defend 
23 the tort-feasor, and now Windsor Insurance is entitled to 
24 reimbursement of all of its costs, and also the attorney 
25 fees that they've expended in order to bring this to 
12 
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court and make American States step up to the plate and 
accept its obligations that it assumed when it received a 
premium from LSI, 
THE COURT: How much do you claim that, if you 
were to prevail, Windsor would be owed? Would it be the 
amount that was paid to the victim in the case? 
MR. WADDOUPS: What I would claim is that the 
default judgment entered against Brenda Chambers, they 
owe us that, and they owe our attorney fees in 
prosecuting this, which would bring it up to around 
63,000, $64,000. 
And I think that addresses my main arguments, 
unless you have some other questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr, Waddoups. 
MR. MORTON: If it please the Court and 
counsel. Your Honor, I'm not sure how you want us to 
proceed. Do you want me to respond to his argument or — 
THE COURT: I think you need to respond to his 
argument, then make your argument, and he can respond to 
it, and then you can make your final. I think that — 
MR. MORTON: And you want me -
THE COURT: I recognize there's some overlap, 
and I'll certainly make allowances for the need to just 
be efficient in how you argue your case. 
MR. MORTON: But you want me to do that all in 
13 
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1 this standing, address his argument and then make my own? 
2 THE COURT: Exactly. 
3 MR. MORTON: Well, your Honor, one thing, when 
4 we talk about this case that's — and we're glossing over 
5 issues and so forth, is a threshold question of statute 
6 of limitations. And there are some important dates that 
7 I'm sure that the Court is aware of, and first being is 
8 that this accident occurred on May 15th, 1993. 
9 Two years after the accident, they filed a 
10 lawsuit. That was on May 17th, 1995, two years and two 
11 days. In that lawsuit, Ms. Zaborski and Windsor were 
12 plaintiff, and Chambers was the defendant, and in that 
13 lawsuit American States wasn't a party. American was not 
14 alleged in that lawsuit. Temporary Services, Inc. was 
15 not a party to that lawsuit, and there were no 
16 allegations in that lawsuit whatsoever that Brenda 
17 Chambers was acting in the course and scope of her 
18 employment at the time of the accident. 
19 So two years after the accident they file their 
20 lawsuit. No answer is filed. They don't take a default 
21 judgment at that particular point in time. They wait 
22 another two years and three months to take a default 
23 judgment. We're now four years and three months after 
24 the accident. Then they take a default judgment, not 
25 against Temporary Services, Inc., not against American 
14 
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States, but they take it against Brenda Chambers only. 
There's no adjudication in that initial lawsuit that says 
Brenda Chambers was an employee, traveling to work, or 
anything. 
They then do a supp — I'm assuming they do a 
supp hearing to find out how they're going to collect 
their judgment, and they find out that she suddenly 
says — now that she's confronted with a $43,000 judgment, 
she says, "Well, I was going to work out at the dump four 
years ago," and this is the first time she's asked to 
recall this incident, four years, three months after the 
accident. 
It's not until almost five years after the 
accident that Temp Services, Inc. or American States are 
even notified about the accident. Temp Services, Inc. 
isn't even named a party, never has been named a party to 
any action. 
There's obviously a four-year statute of 
limitations that applies to this case. They had plenty 
of opportunity to pursue this argument that she was an 
employee of Temp Services, Inc., and they failed to do 
so. And they had plenty of time to do it. So now they 
come back, five years, three months after the fact. They 
file a lawsuit, and they name American States. 
And just right out of the fact that is - in a 
15 
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case that I think just falls right on all fours, Judge, 
is the case of State Farm Mutual Insurance v. Holt, a 
Utah Supreme Court case. And in that case, an insurance 
company filed an action with the court saying it's a dec. 
action, and they ask the court, "Would you please help us 
interpret whether or not the person who caused this 
action is a named insured," it was a declaratory judgment 
action. The court then determines that the insurance 
company's — the individual was a named insured under the 
policy, and then proceeds to enter judgment against the 
insurance company for the full amount. 
The Supreme Court said, "You can't enter 
judgment against the insurance company at this point in 
time because the insured, who was determined to be a 
named insured under the policy, the whole purpose of the 
underlying dec. action, has never been notified or 
advised of this lawsuit." 
Judge, in this case, they haven't even met the 
two threshold questions. First of all, they've never 
served the insured, the named insured, which is Temp 
Services, Inc., and plus they've never made a 
determination of coverage, scope of employment, and those 
things. 
The Supreme Court in that case stated: 
"The answer to this claim is that 
16 
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1 Yotsie" -
2 That was the person that they wanted to find if 
3 he was covered under the policy. 
4 - "has a right to be heard before 
5 judgment can be found against him. 
6 Yotsie has never been served in the case, 
7 and no judgment has ever been rendered 
8 against him for damages to any party." 
9 And then it goes on to say: 
10 "Therefore, no legal obligation on 
11 the part of the plaintiff insurance 
12 company to pay any money pursuant to the 
13 insurance policy" — 
14 There's no obligation to pay money under the 
15 policy to anyone. This case, there's been no 
16 determination that they've been served or made a party to 
17 the lawsuit. There's been no determination that the 
18 plaintiff in this case was in the course and scope of her 
19 employment. So they haven't even met the two threshold 
20 questions of State Farm v. Holt, let alone the second 
21 issue of course and scope of employment. 
22 And those are just an absolute essential 
23 question in this case which can't be addressed — I mean, 
24 again, this underlying action arises out of a tort claim, 
25 and they step into the shoes of their insured. They step 
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into Ms. Chambers' shoes when they bring this action. 
They gain no greater rights, no less rights, than their 
insured, Ms. Chambers. And so they're required under the 
statute to initiate their action within the four-year 
period, and they didn't do it. And they had plenty of 
opportunity to do it. 
They sat back for extended periods of time to 
file the lawsuit. They sat back for extended periods of 
time, two years, to enter the default judgment. Even 
after the default judgment is entered, they sit back and 
they wait to do a supp. order. And the reason that we 
have statute of limitations is so that — to avoid this 
very thing, where people aren't brought in five years 
after the fact and said, "By the way, you now have to 
come in and defend the claim that you have not had the 
opportunity to investigate." 
The plaintiff wants it even better than that. 
They want to come in and say, "Five years after the fact, 
now you have to come in and pay a claim. You have to pay 
a claim that you never had opportunity to defend, never 
had an opportunity to investigate, never had an 
opportunity to even interview the people involved." 
It's inherently unfair, and it just - it flies 
in the face of the whole purpose of the statute of 
limitations. And that goes sort of to the tolling issue, 
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but I'm sure that counsel will try and bring to the -
will provide counter-argument to the Court. 
THE COURT: Now, is it your claim that - you 
have now argued two separate points, the statute of 
limitations and the State Farm v. Holt, which requires 
service to the main insured and a determination of 
coverage, or what are we looking at? 
MR. MORTON: Well, I mean they are two separate 
points. The party that they're seeking to recover money 
from, the person who is legally responsible — I mean the 
insurance company goes out and they write a policy for 
Labor Services, Inc., and the policy says, "We will 
provide coverage and pay those damages for which, those 
damages for which you're liable." 
Well, there's been no determination that 
Temporary Services, Inc. has been — is liable for that. 
There's been no judicial determination of that. They've 
never been served as a party. So, yes, the first 
question under the State Farm case, where they've never 
been named a party, they can't be responsible for damages 
to a third person. 
THE COURT: Well, couldn't they cure that 
problem by amending this complaint and adding LSI as a 
party? 
MR. MORTON: They can't, your Honor, because 
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that should have been done in the first litigation. This 
is not a tort claim. Theyfre now bringing a contract 
action. Their theories are not tort. Their theories are 
a contractual obligation to the insured's statutory 
liability in a dec. action. All of those are going to 
stem out of the underlying lawsuit. 
Judge, if you allow them to do this, it 
circumvents the whole statute of limitations on the tort 
issue* But I think they have to initially go through 
there. If we would have denied coverage — theoretically, 
if they would have named Labor Services, Inc. initially 
in that lawsuit, and we had denied coverage, then we 
could come back and we'd be appropriately before this 
Court. We have denied coverage. 
There was a determination — we could make all 
the arguments that we're making now. It would be an 
appropriate action under an indemnification, contractual 
obligation, things like that. But we were never even 
given a chance in the underlying litigation to even 
participate, and plaintiff's counsel has conceded in 
their brief. We didn't know about this lawsuit until 
well after the four-year statute of limitations had 
expired. 
So they can't suddenly — now, I'm not trying to 
quote James Morton, who's no relationship, but I always 
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call him Brother Jim. As he said to the court before, 
"They're trying to make a pig into a horse." They're 
trying to make a cause of action that's a tort claim that 
they've missed the statute of limitations into another 
animal and bring before the court and try to provide 
coverage. 
And then let me just jump to the 
coming-and-going rule. It is critical to this case, your 
Honor. The only way that vicarious liability attaches to 
Labor Services, Inc. is if she's working in the course 
and scope of her employment. It's a huge issue that's 
never been litigated, never been tried, and plaintiff's 
counsel just assumes that it's fact in all of his 
argument before the Court. 
The cases — and I gladly support — would cite 
the Court the Drake decision from the state of Utah, 
which again had much more favorable facts than plaintiff 
has in this case. In Drake it was undisputed that this 
lady was — when she was driving home. She lived in Salt 
Lake. I believe she lived in — she worked in Salt Lake, 
lived in Ogden. Three days of the week she would drive 
from Salt Lake to Ogden, and was asked by her employer to 
please deliver papers or mail to a particular location. 
It took her out of her normal route of travel. 
She would drive to that particular location, drop off the 
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mail, and in the process of doing that was involved in an 
accident. And the Supreme Court said not in the course 
and scope of her employment. Not in the coming-and-going 
rule, because once she dropped off the mail, even though 
she was out of her normal route and took off, there's no 
coverage. Or there's no — under the state statutes. And 
so they denied that claim. 
The facts in this case are even worse. In this 
particular case, she hasn't been asked by her employer to 
take a particular route and do a particular favor. She's 
going to the landfill to be a secretary. And the 
employer doesn't say how to go there, when to go, other 
than "You get paid when you show up and when you leave." 
Other of significance here is that she wasn't 
driving directly to the landfill when this happened. As 
is similar to the Drake decision, she decides to pull 
into a local store to buy a pair of nylons. Again, this 
is somewhat disputed, but giving plaintiff the benefit of 
the doubt, that she says she has to buy nylons to go work 
at the dump in a trailer out there. 
That's a disputed fact, but giving them the 
benefit of the doubt, assuming that happened. She goes 
into the store to buy her nylons, and as she's coming out 
of that store, that's when the accident occurs. So at 
that particular point she's on a little errand on her own 
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to buy nylons, and it doesn't have anything to do with 
her employment at this point. 
Again, the facts there are less favorable than 
the Draice. It's not the coming-and-going rule, and there 
shouldn't be coverage. We have provided you the two 
cases which the Court noted from California and Florida. 
Those both dealt with personal injury tort claims, and 
they didn't have the underlaying statute of limitations 
problems that plaintiffs have here, but even in those 
cases the coming-and-going rule is no coverage. 
The cases that Windsor cites in this particular 
case are work comp cases out of Louisiana and do not deal 
with tort claims. And again, they weren't confronted 
with statute of limitations problems. But they found, 
because of the unique situation and setting of a work 
comp case where the injured party was the plaintiff 
making a claim under the work comp statutes that they 
were going to afford coverage, which is a far cry from 
whether or not there's liability attaching to a named 
defendant in a tort claim. 
So those cases can be distinguished, but I 
think each state should be allowed to interpret this, 
these statutes, as we go along, and we're not necessarily 
bound by them. But the two best cases that we have that 
are right on point, Judge, right on point, are the 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
California case and the Florida case- And they look at 
the very issues that Mr. Waddoups tries to tell the Court 
that you can set aside. 
Are they absolutely controlling? No, but 
they're factors. Was she paid to drive her car? No. 
Was she reimbursed for mileage? No. Was she told what 
direction she should travel? No. Was she told — she 
could have taken the bus, and in fact the evidence was in 
the past she had taken the bus. 
Well, are they determinative? I mean are they 
absolutely controlling? No, but they're factors, one of 
many, that the Court has to look at. And in this 
situation, we don't control her. At the time of this 
accident, she was driving her boyfriend's car, driving to 
work, stopping on the way to run and errand, and then 
pulled out and went on to the dump — or was trying to go 
on the dump when she had the accident coming from a 
specific errand. 
I've sort of covered quite a few areas, Judge, 
but I don't have any other points that I think need to be 
made because I think I'd start repeating myself. I would 
just say that there's some very significant points that 
the Court has to recognize here. Labor Services, Inc. 
has never been a party to any litigation, not a party to 
this litigation, not a party to the prior litigation. 
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American States Insurance was never notified or 
requested to provide a defense to the claim of 
Ms. Chambers until they were sued in this action. It's 
not as though we were — the defense was proffered, they 
were notified about the lawsuit, and they declined 
coverage. They just didn't know about it, and they were 
never told about it. 
It's never been adjudicated that defendant 
Chambers was acting in the course and scope of her 
employment. That absolutely kills every claim that 
plaintiff is making now. And I think those are just 
points that constantly undermine all of the arguments 
that Windsor is currently making before the Court. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Judge, there's absolutely no 
statute of limitations problem here. We sued Brenda 
Chambers within the four-year statute of limitations. 
That's when the tort statute of limitations was 
applicable. What we're saying is that Brenda Chambers 
was acting within the course and scope of her employment. 
We're litigating that here today. And because of the 
fact that she was acting within the course and scope and 
her employment, she was insured under American States' 
policy. 
As American States' insured, she is entitled to 
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coverage and indemnification for the sums to which she 
has become liable for actions taken within the course and 
scope of her employment with LSI- It doesn't matter that 
we never sued LSI; we didn't have to. It doesn't matter 
that we haven't litigated the course and scope of her 
employment before. That's why we're here. 
THE COURT: How do you get around this State 
Farm v. Holt argument, counsel? 
MR. WADDOUPS: That's the old direct action 
rule, and it doesn't apply to intercompany litigation. 
It simply doesn't. It's been directly address by the 
[inaudible] Supreme Court. I cited the case three or 
four times, but American States shows that there's more. 
The case is State Farm v. Northwestern Mutual, Utah 
Supreme Court, 1996. The direct action rule does not 
apply to intercompany arbitration, I mean litigation. We 
have every right to sue State Farm directly, and there a 
lot of good policy reasons for that. 
May I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. WADDOUPS: See, the big point here is why 
can insurance companies sue each other directly? Because 
there are a lot of insurance companies who like to refuse 
to pay coverage. People like Brenda Chambers are not 
going to sue them; insurance companies are. Therefore, 
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the court allows insurance companies to sue each other to 
say, "We paid this, and there's a policy for that," 
because the court has said time and again that what's 
important is provide the coverage, worry about who's 
going to ultimately pay for it later. 
What happened here is we paid it. Now we're 
entitled to sue them and make them give it back to us. 
State Farm v. Holt has absolutely no applicability 
whatsoever. What we're talking about here is not the 
liability of Brenda Chambers. That's been established. 
We have a judgment against Brenda Chambers. Is she 
American States' insured? That's the question. 
Now, under their contract, she is an insured — 
that's never been disputed by American States — if she 
was performing LSI's work, i.e., if she was within the 
course and scope of her employment. That's the question 
here before you today, not the tort liability statute. 
It's been litigated. We sued Brenda Chambers; we got a 
judgment against her. That's been litigated. 
THE COURT: Anyway, with a default judgment, 
there's no defense, and so American States never had an 
opportunity to raise any issues on behalf of Labor 
Services. And you say that doesn't make any difference? 
MR. WADDOUPS: No. They had a chance to 
defend, but they chose not to. 
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THE COURT: Without a notice? 
MR. WADDOUPS: Yes. I, as soon as I figured 
out that they had a policy insuring LSI, who was Brenda 
Chambers' employer, I wrote them a letter. I said, 
"We'll set aside the default judgment. Go ahead and step 
in. Defend it with a reservation of rights if you want 
to. But step in, defend Brenda Chambers. We'll set 
aside the default. We'll litigate all the issues." 
But they said, "No. We would rather just let 
you sue us," so I did. They can't now say that they 
didn't have an opportunity to defend because they didn't 
choose to accept the opportunity that I gave them. I 
always give the insurance companies a right — the offer 
that they'll set it aside for them. I'll set aside the 
default judgment if they'll step in and take part. 
But if they choose not to take part, they can't 
just run away and think that I can't sue them directly. 
I certainly can. I certainly do, and I certainly have, 
and that's the issue. Now they're saying, "We decided we 
don't have coverage. We don't to dispute the underlying 
facts of the tort case. We choose not to." 
Therefore, the only issue to be resolved is the 
coverage issue. And Mr. Morton keeps wanting to go back 
to the liability, the four-year statute of limitations. 
That's been litigated. It doesn't matter on an issue of 
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coverage. All we're trying to see is if she was within 
the course and scope of her employment to bring her 
within coverage under their policy. That's it. 
At best, that's subject to the six-year statute 
of limitations that applies to written contracts, if 
anything. But the best case on that was the Sharon Steel 
case, where, just like here — Sharon Steel v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Company. Just like here, there were 
two insurance companies providing coverage for the same 
event. One paid; one refused to pay. So the one that 
refused to pay got sued. 
The one that got sued attempted to raise as an 
affirmative defense the statute of limitations. The 
Supreme Court said, "No. This relates back to the filing 
of the original complaint against the insured." Why? 
Because these people — Brenda Chambers and American 
States Insurance Company have an identity of interest, 
that interest being insured and insurer, where there's a 
fiduciary obligation, not just privity of contract. 
The fiduciary duties underlying the duty that 
American States had to defend and refused to comply with 
makes them have an identity of interest with Brenda 
Chambers sufficient to make the statute of limitations 
relate back to the filing of the initial complain against 
Brenda Chambers. That's what Sharon Steel said. 
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THE COURT: Now, let me explore that with you. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I understand their argument, but 
there's been - they would dispute that she was operating 
within the course and scope of her employment. They 
would dispute that LSI had any idea about this lawsuit. 
They would say that to jump to the conclusion that they 
have an identity of interest is a huge leap, given the 
fact that there's no adjudication whatever establishing 
that coverage, or LSI even conceiving it or anything 
else. 
How do you get around to all those problems 
that they've raised to suggest an identity of interest? 
MR. WADDOUPS: That's what we're doing here 
today, is deciding that issue. 
THE COURT: Well, I understand that, but I 
mean — 
MR. WADDOUPS: Okay. 
THE COURT: - it doesn't - it comes after 
considerable analysis. You don't just say they had an 
identity of interest and the Court accept that 
conclusion. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Well, there was considerable 
analysis in my memoranda, I thought. What it comes down 
to, you go all the way back to Allstate v. Ivy, an 
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insurer and an insured, and Beck, where they explain the 
difference between first-party bad faith and third-party 
bad faith. An insurer who has the obligation to defend 
an insured has a fiduciary relationship with that person 
to act in that person's best interests. That is the 
identity of interest sufficient to make what is done with 
one person relatable to the other person. 
Allstate v. Ivy said it best. They said the 
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel have 
to apply because of the fiduciary type relationship 
between the insurer, who owes a duty to defend to their 
insureds. 
THE COURT: So now you're saying that Labor 
Services had a fiduciary duty to Chambers? 
MR. WADDOUPS: No. American States has a 
fiduciary duty to Chambers if she was acting within the 
course and scope of her employment, thus making her an 
insured. That's the principle issue. 
Let me concede one thing, and I didn't think it 
was at all disputed. Yes, if Brenda Chambers was not 
within the course and scope of her employment with LSI on 
the day of this accident, at the time of this accident, 
then American States had no obligation to defend her, has 
no coverage, has no liability in this case. Over and 
done with. That's simple enough. 
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1 The issue — the primary issue — is was she 
2 acting within the course and scope of her employment. I 
3 think it's very clear that she was, because she was 
4 performing LSI's work. The benefits that go to LSI for 
5 her delivering herself to the special employer are huge. 
6 In fact, that's all LSI does. Therefore, she was within 
7 the course and scope of her employment. You don't need 
8 to get beyond that. The going-and-coming rule would 
9 apply to commuting. This is traveling; this is not 
10 commuting. And that's the fundamental distinction. 
11 Okay. Now you've got her in there as an 
12 insured because she was acting within the course and 
13 scope of her employment. So she's American States' 
14 insured. Now, you can address the statute of limitation 
15 issue after you get to that point. The statute of 
16 limitation issue is pretty simple. 
17 American States is wrong five ways from Sunday. 
18 I've set forth five arguments, all of which are better 
19 than American States' argument. The only argument 
20 American States brings up is that the tort statute of 
21 limitation applies because we step into the shoes of the 
22 employer. 
23 Without getting into how simplistic an analysis 
24 of subrogation that is, I'll just blow that aside for a 
25 second to make the main point here. The main point is 
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that we sued Brenda Chambers within the four years. 
That's settled. Can we sue American States? Well, yeah. 
There are plenty of theories under which we can sue 
American States. We can garnish American States. 
If you want to take it to its simplest form 
here, we have a judgment against American States — I 
mean against Brenda Chambers. If she is an insured, 
i.e., if she was acting within the course and scope of 
her employment, we can garnish American States as the 
garnishee because her liability insurance that she's owed 
under the contract is available as her asset. That's the 
simplest way to look at it, if you wanted to look at it 
that way. 
Therefore, would the tort statute of 
limitations come into play as against the garnishee, 
where we've already got judgment against the tort-feasor? 
Of course it doesn't. That's absurd to confuse coverage 
and liability. That's what American States is doing. 
They're not acknowledging the distinction. 
So that's the easiest way to explain it, if it 
comes to that, but there are five or six other analyses 
that are much better than the tort liability statute of 
limitations also. The six-year statute of limitations 
with respect to written contracts. If she had coverage 
under this contract, American States can be sued for its 
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1 owing of coverage under that contract for up to six 
2 years. 
3 That's what we've done. We have sued them for 
4 benefits of the insurance policy, the liability coverage 
5 that they owed to Brenda Chambers. He says, "Well, we 
6 haven't figured out if Brenda Chambers was an insured." 
7 Exactly. That's why we're here. We're arguing whether 
8 traveling to the premises of the special employer is 
9 within the going-and-coming rule. Is it commuting? Is 
10 it going to a fixed premises for fixed hours, like a 
11 normal person in a factory? No, of course it isn't. 
12 The going-and-coming rule only came about 
13 because you've got all of these factory workers who are 
14 trying to get to the factory. They don't do the employer 
15 any good while they're driving to the factory. They only 
16 do the employer any good once they get there. 
17 Now, that's a situation with the landfill. She 
18 didn't provide any secretarial services for him. She 
19 wasn't going to file anything for him. She wasn't going 
20 to copy anything for him until she got to the landfill. 
21 LSI is completely different. We have to acknowledge the 
22 two different employment relationships. 
23 She was doing LSI's business. LSI's business 
24 is the delivery of temporary help to people like the 
25 landfill. Therefore, the only thing it ever does is what 
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Brenda Chambers was doing. Therefore, you never get into 
the coming-and-going rule- You look at whether a benefit 
was bestowed upon LSI or was to be bestowed upon LSI by 
this travel. 
THE COURT: How do you distinguish the Florida 
and California cases from your argument here? 
MR. WADDOUPS: They did not distinguish the 
general employer, special employer difference. They just 
referred to "the employer," without acknowledging that 
there are two different employers here. And they just 
said, "Well, is it really that much different if you're 
traveling to a landfill one day and a factory the next 
day and another factory the next day? Is it that much 
different?" 
Well, if you're only looking at the place where 
they worked and that employer, which is the special 
employer, then they're right. I would agree with that 
analysis. But what they fail to acknowledge is that 
what's important here is the benefit bestowed upon the 
temp agency. The temp agency did all its work through 
this traveling around. 
They're no different than an ice-cream vendor 
that goes to deliver ice cream to a child on the street 
corner. There is no distinction. One is delivering ice 
cream to the child on the street corner. The other is 
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1 delivery a temporary laborer to the site of the 
2 employment. And that's the distinction, and I don't 
3 think the Florida case or the California case got into 
4 this distinction, 
5 But the Utah Supreme Court has made the 
6 distinction extremely clear in Garlcy v. Salazar and 
7 Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries that you've got to 
8 acknowledge the two distinct employment relationships. 
9 And American States never bothered to acknowledge the two 
10 distinct employment relationships. They just have glossed 
11 over the fact that she wasn't providing temporary labor — 
12 temporary — she wasn't providing secretarial services. 
13 Well, that's relevant to the landfill. It's not relevant 
14 to LSI. That's the distinction. 
15 THE COURT: Now, I heard an argument being made 
16 by Mr. Morton on — is it the Drake case? 
17 MR. WADDOUPS: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: How would you meet with argument on 
19 that case? 
20 MR. WADDOUPS: Yes. Well, the easiest way to 
21 address to the Drake case is that you've got to understand 
22 the procedural nature of that case. What happened is, 
23 Drake went before the Industrial Commission. The 
24 Industrial Commission denied her benefits. Went to the 
25 Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals interpreted it in 
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one standard. They gave it a less deferential standard. 
They said basically, "We're going to re-look at this, and 
we're going to give our own analysis to it." 
Their analysis is correct, but what happened is 
then the Industrial Commission appealed to the Supreme 
Court, and the Supreme Court said, "They applied the wrong 
analysis. The Court of Appeals should have been more 
deferential to the Industrial Commission." 
So all the parties agreed that the Court of 
Appeals' analysis was correct, but given the fact that 
they declared that they were obligated to give more 
deference to the Industrial Commission, they gave a 
different analysis based on the deference to the 
Industrial Commission, and therefore they went the way 
they went, which could be interpreted as being against my 
position. I don't think even the Supreme Court's is 
against my position. 
But certainly, if you understand the background 
of Drake v. Industrial Commission, she should have had 
workers' compensation benefits, but given the nature of 
the power vested in the Industrial Commission, the proper 
analysis was never applied. And so I would urge the 
adoption of the Court of Appeals' analysis with respect to 
whether someone's within the course and scope of their 
employment while providing services to their employer. 
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1 But again, that case also has huge, huge factual 
2 dissimilarities with what we're talking about here today. 
3 She did work at a normal company where she'd go to a fixed 
4 premises every day, and so she was performing additional 
5 services during the commute. There was no commute here. 
6 You can't call this a commute. She worked out of her home 
7 for LSI. She was called at home. They said, "Go here." 
8 It doesn't matter that she started at home. 
9 That doesn't make it a commute. If LSI had wanted to take 
10 the commute out of it, and if American States wanted to 
11 force their insured to run their business in a fashion in 
12 which they would not be held liable from the time that a 
13 temporary employee leaves his house to the point where he 
14 gets to the special employer, they could do that. 
15 They could force all their temporary employees 
16 to show up at LSI. Then they could give them their job 
17 assignment for the day at LSI. Then, from the time that 
18 they left LSI, LSI would be liable, but not during the 
19 time when the temporary employee is going from his house 
20 to the temporary service agency. 
21 They could do things this way. The fact that 
22 they choose not to because they think it's better business 
23 and they can make more money if they'd call them at home 
24 has absolutely no relevance to whether they are in fact, 
25 as a matter of law, liable for the travel between their 
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homes and the premises of the special employer, because 
the fact remains that that travel is not a commute. It is 
LSI's business. LSI does nothing else but deliver people 
to special employers. And that's so fundamental to this, 
but itfs only been argued on one side. 
I'll address two things with respect to the 
direct action rule. One, we never served the insured. 
Yeah, we did. We served Brenda Chambers, and we have a 
judgment against her. The question here is was she an 
insured. She wasn't the named insured, but it's pretty 
naive to say that the only insured parties are the named 
insured. 
Second, there's never been a determination of 
coverage. Well, that's why we're here. That's what this 
lawsuit is, is to determine whether Brenda Chambers was 
owed coverage. That's how I addressed the direct action 
rule. All this tort statute of limitations is completely 
irrelevant with respect to LSI and with respect to 
American States. They owe coverage to Brenda Chambers. 
They were allowed to defend, as I just 
explained, even though they chose to not accept it as 
such. And I think that's their argument, is, well, a 
defense was never tendered to us by Brenda Chambers. So 
what? That completely ignores the duty to defend of an 
insurance company. They owe a duty to defend once they 
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understand facts that might be providing coverage under 
the policy. Anytime they are aware of those 
circumstances, they owe a duty to defend. 
There's no obligation that it be tendered and 
signed in blood before they owe any obligation to defend. 
That's just not true. And I have a copy U.S. F&G v. Sant, 
which is the seminal case on that issue, if you'd like to 
view it. 
So course and scope of employment is relevant. 
The coming-and-going rule is not relevant. I mean you 
could sum up my argument by looking at that single issue. 
If she was traveling and doing the work of LSI, then she 
was within the course and scope of her employment. If she 
was commuting, then the coming-and-going rule might apply. 
But, as I explained, it's not commuting; it's traveling. 
And plus, she was called and asked to travel. Therefore, 
she was acting in direct obedience to the instructions of 
her employer. 
Another thing Bob said is that she was buying 
nylons. She wasn't buying nylons; she was done buying 
nylons. She was traveling directly to the place of 
employment. Nevertheless, there's plenty of case law that 
says if you attended to certain personal needs, that does 
not take it outside the course and scope of employment 
unless it is a clear and distinct deviation from the needs 
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of the business, which would be an affirmative defense on 
behalf of American States, and they have not even come 
close to proving all the elements of that or even alleging 
all of the elements of that. 
With respect to LSI's decision not to control 
Brenda Chambers. They didn't pay her. They didn't tell 
her which route to take. They didn't exercise any control 
over her. I have no qualms with that assertion that no 
control over her actions was exercised. But exercise of 
control is not the question; right of control is the 
question. 
Certainly as the employee, who can be told where 
to go, when to come home, for whom to work, whom they 
should obey, has enough control to say, "Drive here and 
take this road," or "Come to LSI. We'll drive you over," 
or even better, nDo you have insurance on your car, 
Ms. Chambers? If not, we'll send a van to pick you up, 
because it's so important to our business that you get 
there, that we will be willing incur that additional 
cost." You know, they don't do that. That would cut into 
profit margins. 
What they do is they subject the public to all 
these temporary employees who are likely to not have 
coverage, and then they say, "Well, they weren't doing our 
work, because we didn't pay them during that time." They 
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can attempt to set up their business however they want, 
and it probably makes good business sense to do it the way 
they're doing it. That doesn't mean that they can avoid 
liability. 
These people all traveling around on the streets 
doing LSI's business are putting the public at risk. 
Therefore, the cost of liability insurance to cover these 
people should be a cost of the enterprise, a cost of doing 
business in temporary labor services. They in fact 
purchased liability insurance coverage. That is secondary 
liability insurance to the car owners' own insurance 
coverage. 
They, in fact, did spend this money as part of 
their business, but American States refuses to provide 
coverage, and then their only defense is, "You can't sue 
us, and we can get away with it." That's absolutely 
wrong. 
And that's what the Supreme Court set forth in 
State Farm v. Northwestern Mutual. They said, "We've 
extended the right of subrogation, not to just suing in 
the name of an insured for money they've paid out, but 
also for suing insurance company to insurance company," 
because the policy that affects is that when an insurance 
company thinks about running out on their obligation of 
providing coverage, they might run out on a Brenda 
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Chambers, who wonrt sue them. They might run out on a 
17-year-old single mother, which was a case I litigated 
against another insurance company who ran out on her. 
They might try all these things because those 
people are unlikely to sue them. That's why 
uninsured-motorist carriers are absolutely entitled to sue 
these companies directly so that there is coverage 
provided when it's due, and that a company can't simply 
just run out on it's liability coverage obligation. 
These are the public-policy concerns that led 
the Supreme Court to acknowledge Windsor's right to sue 
American States directly, and I would suggest that you 
read that case. It's directly on point. State Farm v. 
Holt is completely off point. 
Let me see if there's anything else with respect 
to opposing their motion that I need to address. And 
again, another — like I say, I had five or six theories 
that would allow us to sue them. The one is the 
subrogation under State Farm v. Northwestern Mutual. 
That's the main one. That's the main one I would rely on. 
I think that's the best. 
The second best one is that American States is a 
garnishee, and this could be viewed as a declaratory 
judgment action. 
The third is that this is an indemnity action, 
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and that the statute of limitations is based on 
quasi-contract, and it begins to run from the time that a 
payment is made to the third party, and that's exactly 
what happened here. And it's well within the four-year 
statute of limitations for quasi-contracts. 
The fourth is that this is based on the six-year 
statute of limitations applicable to written contracts 
that we're well within. 
And the fifth is that American States may not 
raise an affirmative defense of statute of limitations, 
because if they owe coverage, if they owed coverage to 
Brenda Chambers, if she was their insured — and I gave 
them a right to enter the litigation, set aside the 
default, and litigate that litigation. I gave them that 
right. They chose not to. 
If she's an insured, then they owed her 
fiduciary obligations, and it's well settled that a 
trustee cannot claim the affirmative defense of statute of 
limitations as against his beneficiary, and we would have 
that situation here too. That's a good argument. 
And fifth, the discovery rule would apply. 
That's the worst argument because then you would be 
accepting that this has anything to do the tort, and it 
has nothing to do with the tort. Again coverage, not 
liability. 
44 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The last thing is Mr. Morton said something 
about how long we took/ two years to take a default after 
Brenda Chambers didn't file an answer. Well/ that's 
simply procedural problems. The insured/ Catherine 
Zaborski/ moved off to Indiana. We got affidavits from 
the insurance representative/ and Judge Hanson said, 
"That's not good enough." We sent our own affidavit; 
that's not good enough. We tried three or four things. 
Finally, he decided that Catherine Zaborski's 
affidavit was good enough. He examined the complaint, 
followed the procedures of Rule 55 in order to enter the 
default judgment/ and so that's why it took two years. 
And then the supp. order was at earliest convenience after 
she could get served. 
So the assertion that we were somehow — I guess 
the assertion is that we were negligent in finding out 
that they should have provided coverage, but that 
argument — and I don't know what they think the legal 
significance of that would be, but it's certainly not 
true, at any rate. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MORTON: Judge/ I'll try not to cover old 
territory and address the issues Mr. Waddoups has brought 
to the Court. 
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1 First of all, it's important that the Court 
2 know, which Mr. Waddoups has not told this Court, as to 
3 how the opportunities — he said where they were given 
4 notice of an opportunity to defend, and they refused to do 
5 so. That was after the judgment was entered, after the 
6 four-year statute of limitations had run, and when 
7 Mr. Waddoups wrote them a letter after he took the supp. 
8 order and said, "Geez, we'll be nice enough to set aside a 
9 judgment against a party that's never been determined to 
10 be your named insured. We'll be glad to set it aside" — 
11 this was some five years after the fact — "and we'll now 
12 allow you to come in and defend this claim," when they 
13 obviously had other defenses. 
14 THE COURT: He claims that it doesn't matter 
15 anyway because of this Northwestern case. How do you 
16 respond to that? 
17 MR. MORTON: The State Farm/North we stern case is 
18 a totally different situation, Judge. In that case we 
19 have two insurance companies — and I'll stand corrected if 
20 I'm wrong — that have the identical named insured. And 
21 the question became a primary or secondary coverage and 
22 who had the obligation to pay. 
23 In this situation, Mr. Waddoups makes a huge 
24 leap time after time after time when he says that 
25 Mrs. Chambers is a named insured. She is not a named 
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1 insured. She is not a named insured under the policy. 
2 She is potentially covered under the policy, but she is 
3 not a named insured. 
4 THE COURT: Oh, I don't think he said she was 
5 named. I think he said she wasn't named. 
6 MR. MORTON: But there's been no determination 
7 that that's in effect. In the Northwestern case, we have 
8 two people who are both named insured named in a lawsuit. 
9 One denies coverage and says, "We're not going to defend. 
10 You defend." The other insurance company goes in and 
11 defends, and then comes back later and says, "You were 
12 wrong." Both of them had an opportunity to go in and 
13 defend the underlying claim in a timely manner. 
14 And I agree with him. There's a direct cause of 
15 action there, because one was put on notice, one declined 
16 to defend, and the other insurance company sued the one, 
17 saying, "You didn't do it at the time. You had the 
18 opportunity to do so." We were never given the 
19 opportunity to even respond. It's a totally different 
20 fact situation than here. 
21 THE COURT: How do you respond to his argument 
22 on the Salazar case, which goes to the coming-and-going 
23 rule in the state? [Inaudible.] 
24 MR. MORTON: Those rules are - those are 
25 different tort claims that - are you talking about the 
47 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 distinction between the special employee versus the 
2 general employee? 
3 THE COURT: Right. 
4 MR. MORTON: Those cases did not deal with the 
5 coming-and-going rule. They dealt with the liability of 
6 the temp agency while the employee is on the job. They're 
7 not talking about coming and going in those particular 
8 rules, and I'll tell you, Utah doesn't have a 
9 coming-and-going rule. 
10 Those cases dealt with a guy at a lumberyard and 
11 whether or not he may have been properly trained. And it 
12 was who had the duty to train him, and so forth, and 
13 whether or not he was immune under work comp statutes 
14 because he may not have been — the employer he's worker 
15 for's statute, he may have been the temp agency's. But 
16 those cases don't have anything to do with the 
17 coming-and-going rule. I mean they don't - they make a 
18 distinction between a special employer and a general 
19 employer for liability, on-the-job accidents with work 
20 comp. 
21 But one thing I would tell the Court is that the 
22 California case did make the distinction that Mr. Waddoups 
23 says they didn't. And they do make a distinction between 
24 general employers and special employers, and so forth. In 
25 the Henderson California case they said: 
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"The court rejected the temporary 
employee's contention that the 
foreseeability of the employee's use 
of his personal automobile in traveling 
to the job site as an employee of a 
temporary agency established that his 
journey was within the scope of his 
employment. The employee argued that 
the fact he did not report to the same 
location each day he worked rendered 
the employee's journey to his job site 
a special errand or a special mission. 
The court rejected this argument, 
indicating that it was not enough 
that the employer could perceive that 
the employee would use his personal 
automobile." 
And the court rejected these special kind of 
employment, special errands distinction because it would 
virtually eliminate the going-and-coming rule. So 
the California court did that, and really what — 
Mr. Waddoups' argument would do the same thing in Utah. 
It would virtually eliminate the coming-and-going rule. 
And so the California court had the opportunity to address 
that. 
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When I heard the argument of plaintiff s counsel 
when he says, "If she's an insured, if she is acting in 
the course and scope of employment" — then he goes on to 
say these things — these things have not been determined. 
And it's not appropriate for this Court to determine in 
this context because — does that mean at that point we're 
bound by the judgment on the damages? Are we bound for 
the liability issues that maybe there was some comparative 
fault of the plaintiff in this matter? 
I mean I can't answer those questions, and the 
reason why I can't answer those questions is because we 
weren't given an opportunity to defend it in the 
underlying lawsuit. Are we bound by that judgment? If he 
comes in and says, MShe was acting in the course and scope 
of her employment." Now you're bound by the judgment. I 
mean if we weren't even given an opportunity to assert the 
various defenses, even if she was acting in the course and 
scope, I don't think we're tied to those. 
I don't know what else. I think I'm going to be 
going over some old issues, your Honor, but the 
opportunity to defend was not in the formal proceeding. 
It was from Mr. Waddoups after he found out about the 
insurance, after the statute of limitations had run, and I 
would suggest that maybe to overcome some of those 
problems. And it's not as though that our insured was 
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served with a copy of the complaint. 
As in the Northwestern case that the Court asked 
about, where their insured was served a copy of the 
complaint. It was tendered to the insurance company. 
They came back; they reviewed the policy. And they come 
in and they say, "Geez, do we want to defend it?" We were 
never given that opportunity. Never. Never within the 
underlying option. 
And we can't be held to this judgment. And 
the — what is it? — the Yates case is a good case on point 
to that. We can't be held liable for a judgment that 
we've never been a party to. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Thank you, counsel. This has been a very 
interesting argument, and I'll have to say it's a 
complicated area. It's not absolutely clear to the Court. 
Having heard the arguments of counsel and having an 
opportunity to review the parties' memoranda, the Court is 
going to at this time grant the motion for summary 
judgment of American States and deny the motion for 
summary junction of Windsor Insurance Company. 
My reasoning is — essentially the reasoning is 
outlined by counsel for the defendant. It is my view, now 
having heard the argument and having an opportunity to 
consider the cases that were submitted from California and 
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1 Florida, that the best law, if there is dispute as to the 
2 law in the country, is the law that the coming-and-going 
3 rule is as applicable to temporary service agencies as it 
4 is anyone else, 
5 I don't find myself persuaded by Mr. Waddoups' 
6 arguments when there's no — when the person that has been 
7 engaged by the temporary service is not paid, there are no 
8 directions given, there's no control, all of the other 
9 factors that have been listed in the cases that have been 
10 referred to, then the Court believes that the 
11 coming-and-going rule should be as applicable there as 
12 otherwise, and that the distinction of special and general 
13 employment, that the Court does not find is a rule that is 
14 applicable to define what the coming-and-going rule is. 
15 The Court is also unpersuaded by the argument 
16 that somehow American States was covered, absent notice, 
17 absent being a named insurer, and believes that the fact 
18 that the statute has run without any notice being given 
19 and without there being any clear coverage — coverage that 
20 is a subject that requires adjudication is a secondary 
21 basis on which the Court would rule in the favor of the 
22 defendant. 
23 Mr. Morton, I'd ask that you prepare an order, 
24 and perhaps include in the order the basic reasonings that 
25 have been set forth in your argument as articulated by the 
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Court so I'll have some kind of a record for that. 
MR. MORTON: Thank you, Judge. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Would you reiterate that last one 
concerning about the notice and the running of the statute 
of limitations. I didn't quite follow you there. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess what I'm saying is I 
agree with Mr. Morton's argument. It seems to me that 
when you don't have a named insured, you don't have 
notice, when you don't have them — the insured — some kind 
of adjudication before the insurance has run indicating 
that in fact American States did bear some insurance 
responsibility to Ms. Chambers in the case, and it seems 
to the Court that that's a second — that's a collateral 
reason. 
MR. WADDOUPS: And that's based on the four-year 
tort statute of limitation. Is that what you're saying? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Or the running of the four-year 
tort statute of limitations? 
THE COURT: It seems to me that you've got to 
have them — you've got a name of an insured. I find the 
argument in the State Farm v. Northwestern case, where 
they're a named insured and they're - and the fact of 
insurance, persuasive in that case is not applicable here, 
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because it seems to me that what you're arguing to the 
Court is there's a need for LSI to step up and for LSI's 
insurer to step up to defend Ms. Chambers when, long past 
the running of the tort statute of limitations, suddenly 
there's notice given to them that they have some 
responsibility, I think you have to do that before the 
statute runs. That's what I'm saying. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Okay. 
THE COURT: We're in recess. 
(Proceedings concluded at 11:35 a.m.) 
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[1] PROCEEDINGS 
[2] 
[3] BRENDA CHAMBERS, 
[4] called as a witness by and on behalf of the 
[5] defendant, being first duly sworn, was examined 
[6] and testified as follows: 
[7] 
[8] EXAMINATION 
[9] BY MS. DUNN: 
[io] Q: Have you ever had a deposition taken 
[11] before? 
[12] A: No. 
[13] Q: Do you know what a deposition is? 
[14] A: Vaguely. 
[15] Q: Well, let me explain to you what it 
[16] is. I am going to ask you some questions, and 
[17] Marsha is going to take down everything that you 
[18} say.That's what she is doing right now. You'll 
[19] need to answer all the questions truthfully. If 
[20] you don't understand something I ask, just ask me 
[21] to restate it or reword it and I'll say it again. 
[22] A: Okay. 
[23] Q: We just need some information from you 
[24] and that's what this is. It's like a little 
[25] interview. Do you have any questions? 
Page 3 
[1] A; Huh-uh (negative). 
[23 Q: After I am done asking questions, 
[3] Trent will probably ask you some questions also. 
[4] A; Okay. 
[5] Q: Can you please state your name. 
t6i A: Brenda DeeAnn Chambers. 
[7] Q: And your date of birth? 
[8] A: July 3rd, 1963. 
[9] Q: Where do you currently live? 
[io] A: 228 South 300 East,apartment 20, 
[11] Q: And your phone number? 
[12] A: 539-1062. 
[13] Q: Do you recall where you were living in 
[14] 1993? 
[15] A: It was 5887 South Baneberry Way. 
[16] Banebeny is 3700 West approximately It's in an 
[17] apartment complex. 
[18] Q: What apartment number would you have 
[19] been in? 
[20] A: It was 5187, Excuse me, 5187 I think. 
[21] Q: Okay. And do you recall the date of 
[22] the accident? 
[23] A: I don't. 
[24] Q: Do you know what day of the week it 
[25] would have been? 
Page 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brenda Chambers 
July 3 0 , 1 9 9 8 
Windsor v. 
American States 
Hi A: It was a Saturday because it wasn't a 
[g usual workday 
[3] Q: And so you usually do not work on 
[4] Saturday? 
{5] A: Correct. 
[6] Q: Why were you going to work on this 
[7] Saturday? 
[8] A; I needed the money. 
[9] Q: Had you been working that week? 
[to] A: I worked like two days that week, 
Hi] Q: Do you recall what days those were? 
[12} A: I don't. 
[13] Q: Do you recall where you worked that 
[u] week? 
[is] A: It was through LSL 
[16] Q: And where did you work through LSI? 
[17] A: They had me temping at several offices 
[18] all over the county. 
[19] Q: And can you tell me about your 
[20] employment at Labor Services, Inc.? 
[21] A: I worked from 1991 through about '95 
[22] through them. 
[23] Q: And what jobs were you required to 
[24] perform? 
[25] A: Receptionist mostly, 
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[1] Q: Did you ever do any jobs that required 
[2] driving? 
[3] A: No, 
K] Q: And did you ever get paid for any 
[5] mileage? 
[8] A: No, they don't do that. 
[7] Q: Or any hours that you drove or 
[8] commuted? 
[9i A: No, they don't do that. 
[io] Q: Can you tell me how you would get 
[11] these job assignments? 
[12] A: They would call me on the phone. I 
[13] already had the slips, and I'd just go out to the 
[14] job site. 
[15] Q: And what were these slips? 
[16] A: They were pay slips where you fill out 
[17] your name and your Social Security number, and 
[18] then they would have how many hours you worked. 
[19] You had to have it signed by the person you worked 
[20] for. 
[21] Q: So whoever you worked for that day, 
[22] you'd take the slip to them? 
[23] A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[24] Q: Would you turn over the slip to them 
[25] at that time? 
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[1] A: Part of the slip went to them, and 
[2] part went back to Labor Services. 
[3] Q: So you returned the slip to Labor 
K] Services? 
[5] A: Correct. 
[6] Q: Would you return the slip that day or 
[7] another day? 
[8] A: Usually Usually it was that day. 
[9] Q: Where? 
[io] A: 1160 South Main. 
[11] Q: Did you ever have to go to Labor 
[12] Services before going to a workplace? 
[13] A: Only to pick up slips because I was 
[U] working on the phones, I was like their 
[15] trouble shooter. They'd throw me into that place 
[16] if everything was going wrong with the client 
[17] because I could fix it. 
[18] Q: Now, on the day of the accident, what 
[19] happened that day? 
[20] A; They called me up and asked me if I 
[21] would go out to Salt Lake County Landfill. 
[22] Q: Where is that located at? 
[23] A: I don t recall the address. It's been 
[24] long enough that — 
[25] Q: Approximately where would that be 
Page 7 
[1] located? 
[2] A: It was like on 5800 West. Out in that 
[3] area. 
Page 8 
Q: Do you recall approximately what south 
it would have been on? 
A: Itwas4lst. 
Q: What time did they call you? 
A: About 8:00. 
Q: Who called you? 
A: It was the labor side* so I don't 
[11] remember who it was. Usually I was in the office 
[12] side. 
Q: What does that mean, labor side? 
A: Going out and actually doing labor 
rather than — I was receptionist/secretary. 
Q: So on this day you were going to go to 
[17] the Salt Lake County Landfill, what were you going 
[is] to be doing there? 
[19] A: I was going to do filing, get their 
[20] files in order. 
[21] Q: Was the office open on that day? 
[22] A: LSI? 
[23] Q: The Salt Lake County Landfill? 
[24] A; Yeah. 
[25] Q: This was a Saturday? 
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[ij A: Uh-huh (affirmative), as close as I 
[2] can remember. 
[3] Q: Did you ever work at Salt Lake County 
[4] Landfill before this day? 
[5} A: No. 
[6] Q: Did you have any contact with anyone 
[7] at Salt Lake County Landfill on this day? 
[8] A: No. Actually I had the nurse at the 
[93 hospital call Labor Services to tell them that I 
po] would not be there because I was in the hospital 
[11] Q: And do you remember the nurse's name? 
[12] Ar Huh-uh (negative), 
[13] Q: Do you recall — 
[H] A: I don't. I was really in shock. 
[15] Q: Do you recall what hospital it was at? 
[16] A: Yeah, it was Pioneer Valley. 
[17] Q: Was it a male or female nurse? 
118] A: Female. 
[19] Q: Now, the date of the accident that I 
po] have is May 13th, 1993. Does that sound about 
[21] correct? 
[22] A: Uh-huh. (affirmative), yes. 
[23] Q: So they called you at 8:00 a.m. that 
[24] morning? 
[25] A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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Q: What conversation took place? 
A: It was just would you go out and work 
here? They always asked, would you do this? I 
said yeah, because I needed the money, because my 
daughter's birthday wras May 14th, so I wanted to 
get her something special. 








[a] this accident? 
[9] A: It was the day after. 
[io] Q: May 14th was your daughter's birthday? 
[11] A: 16th, excuse me. I'm sorry. 
[12] Q: May 16th, so her birthday was going to 
[13] be the next day? Do you recall anything else 
[H] about the conversation? 
[is] A: I told them it would take me a few 
[16] minutes because I had to go and get some nylons, 
[17] They said fine, they will expect you about 9:30. 
[18] They did all the contacts to the employer before 
lis] we even got out there. 
[20] Q: And why did you have to go get nylons? 
[21] A: I was wearing a dress. 
[22] Q: Can you tell me what you did after you 
[23] got off the phone? 
[24] A: I got dressed, I showered and 
[25] dressed. I lived about a block and a half away 
[13 from MacfrugaFs. It was Pick N' Save at the 
[2] time. 
[3] Q: So what time did you leave your home? 
[4] A: Approximately 9:45 — or 8:45, Fin 
[5] sorry. 
[6] Q: And what route did you take? 
[7] A: I went up 5300 South going westbound, 
[8] and went to MacfrugaTs. 
[9] Q: And what's the address of Macfrugal's 
[io] approximately? 
[11] A; It's 40th West and 5300 South. 
[12] Q: And you went to Macfrugal's; is that 
[13] correct? 
[14] A; Yeah. I had already gone in, got the 
[15] nylons and put them on in my car. 
[16] Q: Did you purchase anything else? 
[t7] A; Huh-uh (negative). 
[18] Q: Who paid for the nylons? 
(19] A: I did 
[20] Q: After you left you put them on in your 
[21] vehicle, then what did you do? 
[22] A: I proceeded to pull out of the parking 
[23] lot, and there was a big — one of those big 
[24] jacked-up trucks coming in,They couldn't get in 
[25] until I went out, and I kept trying to see around 
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[I] him. Finally he waved me, like go ahead, it's 
[2] clear. I guess there was someone coming up behind 
[3] him, but it was in his lane so he figured they 
[4] would stop, but they didn't. So I got out — 
[5] just my front of my car was out, and the lady had 
[6] swerved around and hit my car. 
[7] Q: The front of your car was out into the 
[8] second lane; is that correct? 
[9] A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[io] Q: And you're stating that she swerved 
[II] around? 
[12] A: Swerved around the truck. 
[13] Q: Into the second lane? 
[U] A; Correct. 
[15] Q: And collided with you? 
[16] A: Correct, 
[17] Q: And what damage was caused to your 
[is] vehicle? 
[19] A: It was an old car. It dented in 
[20] pretty well. The officer I think said she was 
[21] going like 40 and she didn't know I was there. I 
[22] didn't know she was there, so it was like a — it 
[23] was kind of a fast accident. I know that I had 
[24] pressed on the brakes so hard that my leg muscles 
[25] hurt for like a month afterwards because I stomped 
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HI on the brake as soon as he honked. He was honking 
[2] to let me know she was coming around. 
[3] Q: You turned left onto 5300 South? 
[4i A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[5] Q: Were you going eastbound or westbound? 
[sj A: Westbound. 
m Q: Where was your child at this time 
[8] after you left your home? 
[9i A: With my ex, 
[io] Q: Your ex-husband was there? 
[tu A: My ex — we lived together for ten 
{12} years. 
[13] Q: Your ex-boyfriend? 
[14] A: Yeah. 
[15] Q: So you didn't have to take the child 
[16] to daycare? 
[t7j A: Right, it was just me, 
[18J Q: This was your first stop? 
[19] A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[20] Q: And was it required that you go get 
[21] these nylons? 
[22] A: On all office positions we were 
[23] supposed to wear nylons. 
[24] Q: But they did not direct you that day 
[25] to go purchase them? 
[1] A: No, they knew I was going because I 
[2] told them I have to stop and get nylons first 
[3] because all my nylons were shot. 
[4] Q: Who was in charge of the route you 
[5] took from your house to the workplace? 
[61 A: Just me.They don't tell us how to 
[7] get there unless it's like in a odd position. 
[8] Q: They don't tell you directions on 
[9] that — 
[io] A: They just give you the address. 
[11] Q: So you can choose what route to take, 
[12] where to go? 
[13] A: Correct. 
[14] Q: They had no control over you in that 
[15] way? 
[16] A: Right. 
[17] Q: And they had no control over whether 
[18] you could stop to buy these nylons or not; is that 
[19] correct? 
120] A; Well, if I hadn't, then I wouldn't 
[21] have been able to go to the job site. 
[22] Q: Could you have worn pants that day? 
[23] A: No, they required dresses when we were 
[24] in — especially the workplaces. 
[25] Q: And when you came out of the parking 
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[1] lot, was there any other route that you could have 
[2] taken? 
[3] A: I could have went out on 40th West and 
[4] then turned. I had to make a left out onto 40th 
[53 West to the left at 53rd. 
[6] Q: Did you ever make it to the workplace 
[7] that day? 
[8] A: No. 
[9] Q: So ycu 
[io] A: I ended up with whiplash. In fact, I 
[it] have arthritis in my neck and have physical 
[12] therapy for iuplus I have severe headaches. 
[13] Q: So you provided no benefit to Labor 
[14] Services that day? 
itis) A: No. 
[16] MR. WADDOUPS: I'll object to that, 
[17] just for the record. Calls for a legal 
'[18] conclusion. 
[19] Q: BY MS. DUNN: Did you get paid for 
[20] working that day? 
[21] A: No, 
[22] Q: Did you get paid for your mileage that 
[23] day? 
[24] A: No. 
[25] Q: Did you get paid for any time 
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[1] commuting on this day? 
[2] A: No. 
[3] Q: When you were served with a complaint, 
[4] did you notify Labor Services? 
[5] A: No, I didn't. 
[6] Q: Did you notify American States 
[7] Insurance Company? 
[8] A: I did. 
[9] Q: And who did you notify there? 
[io] At I don't remember at all, 
[11] Q: And how did you notify them? 
[12] A; By phone. 
|[13] Q: And who did you speak to? 
[14] A: I cannot remember. 
[is] Q: How do you know it was American States 
[16] Insurance Company? 
[17] A: It was on the paper. 
[18] Q: Which paper was that? 
[19] A: That was brought to me bv the deputy 
[20] sheriff. 
[21] Q: So the first complaint that you were 
[22] served with when you were getting sued by the 
[23] other woman, you contacted the insurance company 
[24] listed on there? 
[25] A: I told them that I had no means of 
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[ij income because I was in a neck brace, I 
[23 couldn't — 
[3] Q: So that would have been Windsor 
K] Insurance Company? 
[53 A; Right 
[6] Q: Not American States? 
[7] A: Okay, I get confused. 
[8] Q: You notified the insurance company on 
[93 the document itself? 
[103 A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[11] Q: You didn't notify the insurance 
[12] company of Labor Services? 
[13] A: No, I didn't. I didn't realize 
[14} that — 
[15] Q: Did you tell anyone at Labor Services 
[16] about this accident? 
[17] A: Yes, I did. 
[18] Q: Who did you speak with? 
[193 A: I think it was — I think Camille was 
[20] the secretary at the time. 
[21] Q: What did you tell her? 
[22] A: I just told her I had been in an 
[23] accident and would not be available for work for a 
[24] while. 
[25] Q: Did you fill out any workers' 
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_[1] compensation forms or reports? 
[2] A: I didn't even think about that. 
[3] Q: Did you inform them that they should 
[4] tell their insurance company? 
[5] A: No, I didn't. 
[6] Q: Now, I want to ask you more about the 
[7] Salt Lake Landfill. Have you ever worked there 
[8j since? 
[9j A: No. 
[10] Q: And you never worked there on that 
[11] day? 
[12] A: No. 
[13] Q: This was a Saturday? 
[14] A; Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[15] Q: Would it surprise you that the Salt 
[16] Lake Landfill office is closed on Saturday? 
[17] A: That would surprise me. 
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[1] Services do that. 
[2] Q: Why didn't you answer the complaint 
[3] when it was served on you? 
[4] A: At the time I was in the process of 
[5] breaking up with my boyfriend, moving out of my 
[6] apartment. Everything was in chaos. I was 
[7] homeless for a while after that. 
[8] Q: Are you aware that Windsor Insurance 
[9] Company has received a default judgment against 
[10] you? 
in] A: No, I didn't know that. 
[12] Q: According to the court documents, they 
[13] have a judgment against you around $39,000 or 
[14] 41 — 
[15] MR. WADDOUPS: 41,299. 
[16] Q: BY MS. DUNN:Are you aware of that? 
[17] A: I think I received some papers on that 
[18] because they were going to court and I called the 
[19] lawyer. 
[20] Q: Would that be Trent Waddoups? 
[21] A: I think it was that morning. 
[22] MR. WADDOUPS: Didn't you call the 
[23] court? 
[24] THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think I did. 
[25] Q: BY MS. DUNN:You called the court 
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[1] regarding the default? Did you ever notify Labor 
[2] Services about this? 
[3] A: No, I didn't 
[4] Q: Did you ever notify American States 
[5] Insurance Company, Labor Services' insurance — 
[6] A: No. 
[7] Q: On the day of the accident, what was 
[8] the work that you were authorized to do by Labor 
[9] Services? 
[10] A: Lifting boxes and filing, as far as I 
[11] can remember. 
[12] Q: And what time frame were you supposed 
[13] to work from? 
[H] A: It was supposed to be from 8:00 to 
[15] 5:00. but the person they had already to go out 
[16] there called in sick or something, and I was 
[17] always the — 
[18] Q: And that you could not possibly have 
[19] been working there that day? 
[20] A: That does surprise me.The way they 
[21] made it sound is they wanted me to do some filing 
[22] there. 
[23] Q: And so you never contacted the Salt 
[24] Lake Landfill yourself on that day? 
[25] A: No, I asked the nurse to have Labor 
[18] Q: So you were supposed to be a backup 
[19] for someone else? 
[20] A: I was always the backup because I 
[21] would go. 
[22] Q: The person that they had called in. 
[23] Do you mean another person from Labor Services was 
[24] to go in? 
[25] A: That's the impression I got was they 
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[1} had a person lined up, then they didn't show. 
[2] Q: So then they called you as a backup? 
[3j A: Right. 
[4] Q: Whose vehicle were you driving on this 
[5] day? 
[6j A: It was my boyfriend's. 
n Q: What was his name? 
[8] A; His name is Ryan Draper, but the car 
[9] was in my name. He couldn't have a car in his 
[to] name. 
[11] Q: So the title was in your name? 
(12] A: Correct. 
[13] Q: And did you have any insurance on the 
[14] vehicle? 
[is] A: No, I did not. 
[16] Q: And did you have a valid driver's 
[17] license? 
[18] A: What I understood is that I did 
[19] because I had gone down to Carbon County I had 
[20] gotten one ticket my whole life and it was to 
[21] Carbon County. The way they made it sound is they 
[22] didn 't take my driver's license or anything, so I 
[23] supposed that it was still valid. 
[24] Q: You assumed that and you told Labor 
[25] Services you had a driver's license at that time? 
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[1] A: Right. When I first started working 
[2] for Labor Services I was riding the bus anyway. 
[3] Q: And you used to ride the bus to the 
[4] different places? 
[5] A: Uh-huh (affirmative), or I would get a 
[6] ride. 
m Q: How long had you been driving this 
[8] vehicle back and forth to different places? 
[9] A: Probably about four or five months. 
[io] Q: Did you inform Labor Services that you 
[11] were driving this vehicle? 
[i2] A: I don't remember that I did. 
[13] Q: Did the employer pay you for any time 
[H] or use of the vehicle? 
\\5\ A: No, 
[16] Q: Where was the place that you were 
[17] authorized to work at on that day? 
[18] A: Salt Lake County Landfill. 
[19] Q: Did you run any other errands prior to 
[20] the accident? 
[21] A: No. 
[22] Q: If you would not have stopped to get 
[23] these nylons, would you just have been on that 
[24] same street going westbound? 
[25} A: Yeah, I would have. 
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[1] Q: You would not have had to make the 
[2] left-hand turn? 
(3] A; Correct. 
[4] Q: You had not reached the job site yet 
[5] prior to this accident? 
[6] A; No. 
[7] Q: Were you aware that Labor Services had 
[8] transportation that they could provide to you if 
[9] needed? 
[1 o] A: Yes, I was aware of that. 
[11] Q: What was that arrangement? 
[12] A; You had to pay them money to come and 
[13] take you to die job site, then to pick you up and 
[14) bring you back. 
[15] Q: How much was that? 
[16] A: At the time I think it was $2 each 
[17] way. I'm not for sure. 
[18] Q: Did you ever use that service? 
[19] A: No, I never did. Oh, excuse me. Yes, 
[20] I did when I was working in Park City for them. I 
[21] didn't want to drive up and down the mountain in 
[22] the winter 
[23] Q: When you used that service, they were 
[24] in control of the route taken because they would 
[25] come and pick you up; is that correct? 
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[1] A: Correct. 
[2] Q: On the day of the accident you didn't 
[3] render any services to this employer; is that 
[4] correct? 
[5] A: That's correct. 
[6] MR. WADDOUPS: Calls for a legal 
[7] conclusion. I'll object on that basis. 
[8] Q: BY MS. DUNN: Did you do any work for 
[9] Labor Services on that day? 
[10] A: No. 
[11] Q: Did you do any work for the Salt Lake 
[12] Landfill on that day? 
[13] A: No, I did not. I was in the hospital 
[H] most of the day. 
[15] Q: I noticed that you have a daytimer. 
[16] Would you have kept the daytime — 
[17] A: Not then. 
[18] Q: Did you keep a diary of any son? 
[19] A: No. Everything that I did have at 
[20] that time was lost in storage. 
[21] Q: What did you do after the accident, 
[22] immediately following? 
[23] A: I was in the hospital. 
[24] Q: Did they take you there by ambulance? 
[25] A: Yes, they did. 
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[1] Q: And what about the other driver? 
[2] A: She was in the ambulance too 
[3] Q: With you? 
[4] A: Uh-Wh (affirmative). 
[5] Q: Did you have any conversation with 
[6] her? 
[7] A: I do not recall. 1 was in shock, I 
[8} had never been in an accident before 
[9] Q: And have you had any contact with her 
[io] since? 
in) A; No 
[12] Q: What citations did you receive from 
[13] the officer on that day? 
{14] A: Improper lookout, and driving with no 
1151 insurance 
[16] Q: Are you aware you also received a 
[17] driving with a suspended license citation at that 
[is] time? 
ps] A: Yeah That's what I meant by the 
{20} drivers — 
[21] Q: Oh, no insurance? 
[22] A: No, and — yeah, driving with no 
[23] license That s what I meant, that it was 
[24] suspended. 
[25] Q: Was the car ever used by Labor 
Page 26 
[1] Services, Inc. themselves? 
[2] A: No 
[3] Q: Did they rent the vehicle from vou? 
[4] A: N o 
[5] Q: Did they ever lease the vehicle from 
[6] you? 
[7] A: N o . 
[8] Q: Did they ever borrow the vehicle from 
[9] you? 
[io] A: N o 
[11] Q: Did they ever hire the vehicle from 
[12] you? 
[13] A: No 
[H] Q: What was your agreement with Labor 
[15] Services regardmg employment? 
ri6] A: Just that I would go to the job site 
[17] if I promised to go there, and if I had any 
[18] problems to call them 
[19] Q: And when you were at the job site, did 
[20] they have any control over you at that job site? 
[21] A: No It was entirely in the hands of 
[22] the employer 
[23] Q. How were you paid? 
[24] A: I was paid whenever I wanted to be 
[25] actually because I was one of their better 
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[1] workers So I was paid — like if I needed to get 
{2] paid that day, I could get paid that day 
[3] Q: For the amount of hours you would 
[4] work? 
[5] A: Correct 
[6] Q: You were paid hourly? 
[7] A: Correct 
[8] Q: What was your hourly wage? 
[9] A: Anywhere from 7 to $9 an hour. 
[io] Q: Did you receive any benefits? 
[11] A: No I had medical insurance already, 
[12] SO — 
[13] Q: Now, I noticed that you had filled out 
[H] an affidavit in this case. Do you remember 
[15] signing that? Mr. Waddoups brought it over to 
[16] you . 
[i7j A: Yeah. 
[18] Q: Now, I am gomg to go through this 
[19] with you and we'll discuss some issues on here 
[20] A: Okay 
[21] Q: First it states that you signed this 
[22] under penalty of perjury as follows, that on the 
[23] morning of May 15th, 1993 at or about 5415 South 
[24] and 4020 West, you caused an accident m which my 
[25] vehicle collided with the vehicle of Kathryn 
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[1] Zaborski Did you fill out this form yourself 
12] A : No 
[3] Q: Did you provide the information for 
[4] this form to anyone? 
[5] A* I don't recall to be honest with you 
[6] I am on all kmds of medications right now 
[7] Q: Do you believe that you caused this 
[8] accident? 
[9] A: By not driving with insurance, yeah 
[io] I should have been driving with insurance 
[11] Q: Do you think your pulling out caused 
[12] the accident? 
[13] A: Well, actually I guess it was kind of 
[u] a toss-up because he was waving me, basically 
[is] telling me it was clear I could not see around 
[16] him or around at all 
[17] Q: What about the other woman that was 
I [18] driving, do you think she contributed to the 
[19] accident? 
[20] A; Maybe a little just by — 
[21] Q: Gomg around? 
[22] A: Gomg around. 
[23] Q: Now, the next paragraph states you 
[24] were contacted by Labor Services about one hour 
[25] prior to this to work at the Salt Lake Landfill. 
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[ij A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[2] Q: You say earlier you do not recall who 
[3] contacted you? 
f4j A; I don't. They have gone through i 
[5) several people since. Tve worked for them since 
[6] then. 
[7] Q: Would it have been a man or woman? 
[8) A: A woman. 
[9] Q: And the next statement says you 
[io] immediately started to prepare for that day's work 
[11] assignment. What would you have done to prepare 
[12] for the workday assignment? 
[t3] A: Shower. I had a perm in my hair so I 
[14) didn't have to do much with it, I put on my 
[is} makeup and — 
[16] Q: Just normal hygiene things? 
[i7j A: Yeah. 
[18] Q: Nothing that you were getting paid for 
[19] or reviewing documents or — 
[20] A: No, 
[21] Q: — working in any way? 
[22] A: No. 
[23] Q: Just mainly getting dressed and ready 
[24] and leaving the house? 
[25] A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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[1] Q: Would you agree to that? 
[2] A: Yes. 
[3] Q: And said that you were familiar with 
[4] the requirements of Labor Services as you had 
[5] worked for them for approximately one and a half 
[6] years prior to the accident. 
[7] A: Correct, 
[8] Q: What were the requirements? 
[9] A: To be prompt, show up for work when 
{to] you said you would, on days that you specified 
Hi] that you would work. We were free to refuse any 
{12] assignment and it did not affect whether they 
[13} would call us again. That's about it. I mean, 
[14] they really can't — 
[15] Q: The next statement says you provided 
[16] temporary secretarial services for businesses who 
[17] contracted with your employer, Labor Services. 
[18] Would you consider Labor Services your employer? 
[19] A: Yeah, it was my employer. 
[20] Q: And the only services you were 
[21] providing were temporary secretarial services? 
M A: Correct 
[23] Q: So you were never contracted to drive? 
[24j A: I think I went once and worked in 
[25] Lynn Wilson's rolling up — 
Page 31 
[1] Q: Tortillas? 
[2] A; Yeah. 
[3] Q: But you were never contracted as a 
[4j driver for Labor Services? 
[5] A: No. 
[6] Q: Says you were always called at home 
[7] and asked to go directly to your work assignment? 
[8] A: Correct. 
[9] Q: And directly meaning no stops; is that 
[io] correct? 
[11] A: Actually, like I said, I told them I 
[12] was going for nylons or told them I had to stop. 
[13] Q: You might be running late? 
[14] A: I always called them if I had any 
[15] problems, like if my car wouldn't start or if like 
[16] my child was sick.That's why I was working temps 
[17] is because J have an ADH child and he really kind 
tiaj of ran the gamut on daycares. 
[19] Q: On the day of the accident Labor 
[20] Services, as it was accustomed, called me at home 
[21] and asked me to go directly to my assignment; is 
[22] that correct? 
[23i A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[24] Q: You were supposed to be at your 
[25] assignment at the landfill at 9:00 a.m.? 
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[I] A; Yeah. 
[2] Q: You w e r e runn ing late w h e n the 
[3] acc iden t o c c u r r e d at 9:10. Is tha t approximate ly 
[4] w h e n t h e acc iden t occur red? 
[5] A; Yeah. T h e r e w a s a lot of p e o p l e at 
[6] t h e store 
[7] Q: The n e x t s t a t ement says I was 
[8] traveling directly to Salt Lake Landfill as 
[9] d i rec ted by Labor Services w h e n t h e acc iden t 
[io] o c c u r r e d . F rom w h a t you stated today that ' s 
[II] incorrect? 
[12] A; Yeah. 
[13] Q: You actually stopped somewhere? 
[H] MR. WADDOUPS: Objection, calls for a 
[15] conclusion. 
[16] Q: BY MS. DUNN: Isn't it true you 
[17] stopped somewhere, you didn't go directly — 
[18] A; Yeah, I stopped to get nylons. 
[19] MR. WADDOUPS: Objection, again, it's 
[20] putting words in the witness's mouth, leading, not 
[21] consistent with the evidence. 
[22] Q: BY MS. DUNN: Isn't it true you did 
[23] not go directly to the Salt Lake Landfill? 
[24] A; That's true. 
[25] MR. WADDOUPS: Objection, the 
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[1] affidavit says at the time of the accident. 
[2] MS. DUNN: Your objection is noted. 
[3] Q: BY MS. DUNN: You had stopped, 
[4] correct? 
[5) A; Correct. 
[6] Q: And the next statement says that you 
m were taken to the hospital and treated for your 
[8] injuries; is that correct? 
[9i A: Yes, that's correct. 
[io] Q: And then the hospital staff called 
[11] Labor Services and advised them that you would be 
[12] unable to work because of your injuries; is that 
[13] correct? 
[u] A; Correct. 
[15] Q: Do you remember signing this document? 
[16] A: I do. 
[17] Q: And did you review the document at 
[is] that time? 
[is] A: Yes, I did. 
po] Q: Do you know who drafted up this 
pi] document? 
[22] A: I would suppose it was someone in the 
£3} office.I don't know. 
[24] Q: Did you have any other conversation 
[25] with anyone beside myself before this deposition | 
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[1] regarding this accident? 
[2] A: I did call and tell them that I 
[3] wouldn't be in court,. I have problems at my house 
[4] right now. 
[5] Q: When you signed this affidavit, did 
[6] you talk to Mr. Waddoups here today? 
m A; Uh-huh (affirmative), I think so. 
[8] Q: Do you recall any conversations that 
[9] you had with him on that day? 
po] A: Not really. I have been on — I am on 
[11] medications. 
[12] Q: What are those medications. 
[13] **Ignore this, I have to call the wit. 
[14] A: Darvocet, Valium, Serzone, Prilosec, 
[15] Claretin, and I don't remember the other one right 
[16] now. I'm sorry, 
[17] Q: And why are you on these medications? 
[18] A: I have got post-traumatic stress 
[19] syndrome from after — well, actually it was 
[20] before I worked for Labor Services, but it wasn't 
[21] something that I was aware of really until I ended 
[22] up at the hospital. 
[23] Q: On this day? 
[24] A: No. 
[25] Q: Another time? 
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[1] A: Another time. I'm under the care of a 
[2] neurologist for headaches caused from the 
[3] arthritis in my neck. 
[4] Q: Now, on this day after you got in the 
[5] accident and they called Labor Services, do you 
[6] know if Labor Services sent someone else out? 
17] A: I have no idea.They did not tell me. 
[8] Q: Would they usually have to send 
[9] someone out in these circumstances? 
[io] A: Yeah, they try and fill a position. 
[11] Q: So they would have had to go through 
[12] extra work because you got in this accident? 
[13] A: Yeah. 
[H] Q: Because of the route you took on this 
[15] day? 
[16] A: Correct. 
[17] Q: At the time of the accident, would you 
[18] consider yourself working for Labor Services at 
[19] that time? 
po] A: Yes, because I was going to their job 
[21] site. 
[22] Q: But you weren't getting paid at that 
[23] time? 
[24] A: No, I wasn't getting paid at the time. 
[25] Q: They didn't have any control over you 
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[1] at that time? 
[2] A: No, they didn't. 
[3] MR. WADDOUPS: Objection, calls for a 
[4] legal conclusion, leading. 
[5] MS. DUNN: You can lead under these 
[6] circumstances. 
[7i MR. WADDOUPS: I know, and I can put 
[8] the objection on the record. 
[93 Q: BY MS. DUNN: So they had no control 
[io] over you at this time? 
[11] A: Not — 
[12] MR. WADDOUPS: Same objection. Go 
[13] ahead and answer. 
[14] THE WITNESS: I'm getting confused. 
[15] Q: BY MS. DUNN:They didn't tell you 
[16] what to do at that time? 
[17] A: Well, they told me that it was okay 
[18] that I stop and get nylons.They knew that I was 
[19] going to — 
[20] Q: Did you ever sign a contract with 
[21] Labor Services? 
[22] A: I filled out an application and — I 
[23] had been working for them for a while, I 
[24] worked — I would work most days and days that I 
[25] wanted to work. In fact, they had me come into 
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Ml the office and work in their office for 
& secretarial work for the collections department 
[3j and answering phone$, 
[4] Q: Now, you would not get paid until you 
[5] actually reached •— 
[6j A: Eight. 
m Q: — the special employer for that day? 
\& A: Correct. 
[9] MS. DUNN: I think that's all the 
tio] questions I have at this time. 
[111 
[12] EXAMINATION 
[13] B Y M R . W A D D O U P S : 
[H] Q: I just have one question. It refers to 
[15] your mental state just prior to the accident. You 
[16] had just gone into Macfrugal's, you purchased your 
[17] nylons and then you put the nylons on in the car. 
[is] As you were leaving the parking lot, were you 
[19] heading directly to your job site? 
[20] A: Yes, I was. 
[21] Q: You had not planned on making any 
[22] other stops prior to arriving at the job site? 
[23] A: No. 
[24] MR. WADDOUPS: That's all the 
[25] questions I have. 
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[1] (Whereupon the deposition concluded at 




























[2] STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
[3] COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
[4] 
[5] This Is to certify that the deposition 
[6] of BRENDA CHAMBERS, the witness in the foregoing 
[7] deposition named, was taken before me, MARSHA 
[8] ROMNEY, a certified shorthand reporter and notary 
[9] public in and for the State of Utah, residing at 
[10] Salt Lake City, Utah. 
[11] That the said witness was by me, before 
| [12] examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the 
[13] whole truth and nothing but the truth in said 
i [U] cause. 
[15] That the testimony of said witness was 
[16] reported by me in stenotype, and thereafter caused 
[17] by me to be transcribed into typewriting, and that 
[18] a full, true and correct transcription of said 
[19] testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in 
[20] the foregoing pages numbered from 3 through 38, 
[21] inclusive, and said witness deposed and said as in 
[22] the foregoing annexed deposition. 
[23] I further certify that after the said 
[24] deposition was transcribed, the original of same 
[25] was retained by me for filing with the clerk of 
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[1] said court. 
[2] I further certify that I am not of kin 
[3] or otherwise associated with any of the parties to 
[4] said cause of action, and that I am not interested 
[5] in the event thereof. 
[6] Witness my hand and official seal at 





[11] My Commission Expires: 
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